The AMERICAN REVIEW
VOLUME FOUR NUMBER FOUR
FEBRUARY 1935

Authority and Tyranny

Ross J. S. Hoffman

IN AN essay published several months ago in The American Review I argued for the need of erecting an authoritarian political power to defend our society against menacing destructive forces and to serve as an instrument in the work of establishing a social order more suitable to the nature of man than the present order. Rejecting the liberal-democratic state as a football of social conflict, I advocated a revised social contract to make possible a strong, popular, independent, and essentially monarchical state. The state thus envisaged I characterized as "a humanistic and ethical state, sworn to alliance with good morals and civilized religion, having much more in common with the early mediaeval monarchies . . . than with the modern laicized, bureaucratic state". Further, I maintained that such a state, properly to perform its task, would have to intervene importantly in the cultural and moral as well as in the economic spheres of life, it being now evident that without such intervention no power can any longer defend society or assist the cure of its diseases.

Nowhere in that former essay, however, was it my wish to suggest that such a new state could of itself restore a truly human social order. Being fully convinced that there is not to be found any merely external solution for the problem of how to salvage the genuine values in our traditional civilization, I sought to avoid the error, common to liberals and humanitarian socialists alike, of conceiving our defects and difficulties as rooted in organizational or mechanistic dislocations rather than in the realm of intellect and spirit. A new political arrangement, one may confidently assert, would be as external (and therefore as ineffective for regenerating society) as a new economic arrangement, unless it were accompanied by — were indeed but an expression of — a voluntaristic movement by society itself. Men can no more be made wise and good by law than by prosperity. The state, therefore, cannot restore society; it can only serve as an instrument to break the way for the operation of restorative forces. It can attack predatory and corrupting powers which prey upon and debase society; it can defend (although not create) a code of right morals; it can even execute an ethical mission by brave and heroic leadership; but it cannot supply values, nor make men good against their will.

Recognizing this limited competence of the state, I gave no endorsement to what passes today under the name "totalitarian" state, nor did I approve the servile state. No more did I advocate any new Leviathan or Caesaristic absolutism in which the sanction of law resides in the will of a sovereign prince. The authority proposed was limited in its area of lawful exercise. The essay, moreover, contained neither a formal nor implied rejection of sovereign democracy; rather it designated the social contract as "the only legitimate foundation for government". Therefore the implication would have been clear, even had I not specifically stated it, that the enunciated political doctrine reserved a right of public resistance to any unlawful exercise of authority, that is, any extension of it outside the bond of the contract. Nevertheless it was easy to anticipate an objection that the doctrine of authority set forth in the essay might open the way to unrestricted tyranny, since there could be no absolute guarantee that public resistance would always be competent to prevent or even to resist abuses of authority. That objection, even if wholly valid, cannot warrant rejecting the authoritarian doctrine, since alternative political doctrines lead even more certainly to tyranny; but it is nevertheless an objection that should be met. I propose in this essay to meet it.

II

I may begin by admitting the quite obvious truth that there is no conceivable guarantee that a leader possessing great power will not develop an appetite for tyranny. He may come to power with all the fine promise of a Henry VIII, and yet end as that king ended. Similarly, it may be admitted that the instruments of power are today so great that a tyrant is a more potent enemy of the general welfare that ever he was in days of a simpler civilization. The decisions of a modern Fascist dictator touch more directly the lives of men than did the decisions of Metternich, or Louis XIV, or the Roman Emperors; and the means of enforcing those decisions are correspondingly greater. This fact, however, is far from being an argument against the re-establishment of authority; it only suggests the measure of danger which everywhere confronts us. For on the one side we see the approach of the bureaucratic servile state commanded by the plutocrats, and on the other side we see the approach of the bureaucratic servile state commanded by the disciples of Bentham and Marx, who tend more and more to coalesce in one hostile force. To maintain ourselves against these enemies we must be strong; to be strong we must be well organized; and to be well organized we must have authority. Of course that is dangerous, but our whole position is beset by danger, and we will only make defeat more certain if, from fear of their going over to the enemy, we refuse to trust our own officers. There is, one may freely admit, no complete guarantee that they will not betray us, but whether or no they could actually succeed in a betrayal depends almost wholly on us.

Historical considerations, it appears, lead to a recognition that the tendency for authority to grow tyrannical is causally related to the disruption of society. A healthy and well-organized society (*i.e.*, one marked by a high measure of justice) invariably exhibits a balanced relationship between the governor and the governed, each exerting a constant will to hold the other within the bond of the social contract. To maintain that balance, which is a delicate one and can be upset by either the abuse or destruction of authority, is therefore an essential purpose of rational politics. Now history is rich in material for support of the thesis to be defended here, for whenever we discover authority becoming tyrannical we can also discern that this unfortunate development has been preceded and accompanied by the decay of society; that is, we can see the weakness of one element destroying the balance and leading to an exaggeration of the other element. And, similarly, the restoration of society has always involved the return of authority, as an implementation of the restoration movement and as the means for re-establishing the necessary balance. Let us take as an initial historical illustration the case of the Roman Empire. In the two centuries prior to the Caesarian dictatorship, the city-state of Rome flung its dominion over Italy, Sicily, Gaul, Carthaginian Africa, and Spain, and took the hegemony of the Hellenistic East. This immense accomplishment was not due merely to the patriotic virtues and ambitions of Rome, but to the very practical working alliance between Roman arms and Roman capitalism. The making of the vast republican empire was certainly a manifestation of the extraordinary genius of Roman soldiers and statesmen, but it was emphaticallly not an expression of restored and healthy social order. The empire was built upon the ruins of older states and societies, and what had ruined them was also visibly ruining Rome long before the Caesarian revolution. For capitalism as practised by the Romans was a fiercely predatory thing, destroying small properties like a malignant acid, emptying the countryside of free-holding farmers and filling the cities with a disinherited proletariat. "The savage beasts in Italy", Tiberius Gracchus told his countrymen, "have their particular dens, they have their places of refuge and repose; but the men who bear arms, and expose their lives for the safety of their country, enjoy in the meantime nothing more in it than the air and light." It was in this torn and dislocated society, which distressed the Stoic conscience of antiquity very much as modern society distresses the humanitarian-liberal conscience, that there lay the causes for those civil wars which in the last century before the Christian era carried the whole Roman world to the brink of ruin. The Roman Senate, supreme organ of the republic, was entirely under capitalist influences, and like the modern liberal parliament could not bring itself to act save when irresistible pressure was brought to bear upon it. Hence legitimate demands for reform were denied, and a situation developed which overthrew the senatorial oligarchy and inaugurated the Augustan principate. Bitter experience at length reconciled Senate and people to a dictatorial régime which at least possessed some initiative and could actually govern against the destructive forces assailing the existence of the Empire.

The problem which Augustus and his successors faced was in many respects like the problem confronting the modern Fascist dictators. To bring order out of chaos they had to establish a wide supremacy of the state over society, at the same time taking care lest they crush out the freedom necessary for the life of society. The Augustan revolution thus consisted not only in the superimposing of strong central government over popular institutions but also in the restoration of many popular institutions which had fallen into decay. Augustus made a real effort to maintain a social and political system which would require a minimum of intervention by the supreme governing hand. He recognized that the mere machinery of state power was not adequate means for restoring a society healthy and strong enough to maintain the Roman political system, which was of course his prime concern. He understood that the successful operation of any system of government depended finally on the character of the people, and that is the reason why he sought to revive the old Roman spirit and traditional culture. Unfortunately neither he nor his successors possessed any means for infusing Roman life with fresh creative energies of the spirit, without which restoration of a sound society was impossible. Hence more and more the Emperors neglected the social mission of the state in order to concentrate their full attention upon the ever-pressing and immediate business of holding together a political system. They sought to maintain peace, pay the soldiers, and keep the proletariat in order by doles, amusements, and assurance of the good will of the gods. But of course the more they resorted to these expedients the deeper decay ate into society.

The rich steadily grew more selfish and irresponsible; the poor steadily became more wretched and dehumanized; and all were caught in the suffocating clutch of the servile state, which multiplied its interventions in the social order and could only maintain itself by destroying the independence, initiative, freedom, and responsibility of its citizens. The state at length became a mere end in itself, and as such it warred increasingly on every human liberty. To avoid breakdown it legislated to keep men at their appointed callings even when this involved their ruin; trade and offices were made hereditary so that the support of the militarized imperial system might go on. In the eyes of the government the whole social-economic order came to exist primarily for the support of the bureaucracy and army, and the consequence was the flight of the population from productive work into the army, into the civil service, into the Church, or into the wilderness. Private industry fell away, the fields were deserted, and despair paralyzed initiative. The will to support the political system failed, and when the barbarians began to occupy the provinces they were frequently received as deliverers from a hard yoke. Such were the consequences of a state system which eventually became the enemy of the very society it had arisen to defend.

Now when one reflects upon this great historical phenomenon of the Roman state breaking down of its own weight, it appears that the basic and major reasons for it really lay in a decadent society rather than in the political system. Augustus had not sought to impose the servile state, but to restore authority, order, and freedom; that is, he tried to re-establish the balance between governor and governed. The state had foundered and he restored it; but because he did not (for he could not) renew the energies of society, no balance was maintained. The social decay continued and therefore the people who created the empire became reluctant to make the sacrifices and carry the burdens necessary to sustain it. We see this especially in the decline of the military spirit and resultant transformation of the character of the Roman army. From having been patriotic levies, the imperial troops became professional mercenaries who, as Christopher Dawson has described them, "gradually lost contact with the citizen population of the more urbanized parts of the Empire and became a separate class with a strong sense of social solidarity". Of peasant origin and but partly Romanized, their "whole interest and loyalty centred in their corps and commanders". Under the military sergeant-major Emperors raised to the purple by this class an enormous increase of taxation was rendered necessary to satisfy the demands of the soldiers, who played the same parasitic rôle in those times that the swarm of politicians and bureaucrats play today. And this of course was what forced on the great destruction of liberty. The Emperors had to maintain the state, but to do so they had to remain in a vicious circle which only a dissolution or reconstruction of the social-political order could break; for the longer the system lived the greater became the discontent, which in turn swelled the need for those very soldiers who were consuming the material substance of Roman life. Nothing but a social reformation of the most fundamental and far-reaching kind could ward off a final disaster. The rise of the new society of the Church and the political exploitation of it by the Emperors enabled them to go on under a modified system in the East, but in the West the state perished and the old social order dissolved.

The course of events was logical and irresistible. Authority had turned tyrannical as social decay proceeded; the disruption of society increased the need for state interventions, which stimulated bureaucracy and professional militarism and opened the way for princes to gratify the appetite for tyranny; hence the final collapse. In that memorable and painful experience of Western civilization there is a deep lesson to be learned well by all today who are turning for social salvation to the "totalitarian" state. And the lesson is that the state which becomes a mere end in itself, and subordinates all interests to itself, cannot but end by destroying its own foundations, like the snake that eats its own tail. Unless the new authoritarian state which we so sorely need today (as Rome needed Caesar and Augustus) is a real expression of renewed social health, and unless it undertakes a truly radical social mission supported by a determined popular will, it will end as the Roman imperial state ended.

III

Ten centuries after the breakdown of the Roman political system in Western Europe, men were once again face to face with authority growing tyrannical. In this situation we may find another illustration of the relationship between tyranny and social decay, for the mediaeval monarchies of Christendom, from the thirteenth century onward, took very much the same fatal course that the Roman Empire had traversed. From being primarily instruments of order, authority, and justice they became absolutist tyrannies, fated to be overwhelmed by the modern revolutionary movement which tore up the sanctions of all authority and created the chaos of today.

But before remarking upon the dissolution of these monarchies, it would be well to recall something about their origin. They rose out of that welter of anarchy which followed the break-up of Roman state order. The political system which had followed the latter was feudalism, a crude organization of local community defence thrown up by a society possessing no independent state power capable of defending the common good; and this feudalism, wherever a strong king was wanting, was naked class government. The lesser and weaker members of the community turned for protection to the greater and stronger members, and thus created a political system cemented by the tie of contractual relationships. This contractual nature of feudalism appears in two forms. First, there was a social contract, implied rather than formal, between the peasant community and the lord of the manor, the former agreeing to support the latter economically in return for the protection he could offer. The second contractual element was the formal lord-vassal bond which held together in a political network the members of the ruling, protecting class. That class, clerical as well as lay in composition, carried on the military and religious government of Christendom and subsisted on the fruits of the labour of the masses; and theoretically this was perfectly fair and satisfactory, there being no inherent injustice in the circumstance that the masses provided economic support for those who were ministering to their temporal and spiritual welfare.

It would indeed have been a quite admirable arrangement (since the social bond was a human and functional one rather than a mere property relationship), save for the unhappy fact that the feudal governing class, like all class governments, grossly abused its power. There were, roughly, two kinds of barons: those who protected the community (*i.e.*, discharged honourably their obligations under the implied social contract), and those who took advantage of their position to prey upon the community. (One can discern a similar cleavage in any ruling class, even in the wealthy class that has governed society in the modern era of industrial capitalism and liberal democracy.) Now it is historically evident that the mediaeval feudal class contained so large a number of the predatory sort of barons that the great mass of nameless people in the peasant communities and growing towns had serious grievances; and it was their strong conviction that honest and peaceful men could enjoy greater liberty, security, and prosperity if there were a king strong enough to restrain the predatory element in the feudality. That is the reason why in the great popular awakening of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the kings rose from being mere titular heads of the feudal hierarchy to become rulers with real powers of command. They were the liberators and "supreme justiciars" of their people, from whom they received determined support along with assistance from the genuinely knightly members of the feudality.

These mediaeval monarchs, of whom St. Louis IX of France is perhaps the noblest example, were intensely popular and very near indeed to their people. They were not despots, but contractual rulers, for the later doctrine of unconditional duty of obedience to sovereign princes was foreign to the mediaeval mind. Prince and people had reciprocal rights which had to be respected and reciprocal duties which had to be discharged. As Gierke has said,

> the mediaeval doctrine taught that every command which exceeded the limits of the ruler's authority was a mere nullity, and obliged none to obedience. And then, again, it proclaimed the right of resistance, and even armed resistance, against the compulsory enforcement of any unrighteous and tyrannical measures, such enforcement being regarded as an act of violence.

The mediaeval doctrine of course placed the ultimate sanction for all lawful authority, secular as well as spiritual, in the Divine Creator of man and society, but it held that kings derived their immediate authority from the will of the people, with whom they were bound in contract; which contract can be read in a thousand mediaeval charters. Here was no twisted doctrine of divine-right absolutism such as came in with the post-Reformation princes. And that is the reason (to use the words of Mr. Arthur J. Penty) why

> it was precisely in the Middle Ages, when there was nothing sacrosanct about the institution of monarchy, that kings were popular and their lives very much safer than they are today. They were supposed to act impartially, to protect the people against oppression by the nobles, and to be the impersonation of justice, mercy, generosity, and greatness; and it is to be presumed that it was because they did to some extent fulfill such expectations that monarchy was popular. [*A Guildsman's Interpretation of History*.]

Now the significant point concerning the rise of these monarchies that I want to emphasize here is that their growth synchronized with and was itself an expression of a genuine restoration of healthy, vital, and creative society. This was the age of the great crusades, of the Gothic cathedrals, of the rise of towns and guilds and their communal emancipation from old feudal controls, of the multiplication of new religious orders, of the birth of the universities, of the scholastic philosophy and the Aristotelian revival of science, of Church reform and spiritual awakening. The creative spirit burst forth from that rude peasant-soldier culture of Western Christendom which had been in a virtual state of siege since the fall of the Roman Empire. A world of rich and variegated colours sprang to life like a garden in bloom on the morning of a new spring day. The old feudal order was torn to pieces by the rise of the real popular culture of the Middle Ages, and the leaders of the people were the kings. This mediaeval society was not, of course, a perfect society, and I do not mean to idealize it by the falsification of history, but it did mark a renewal of social energies, the strength of which is attested by the fact that the main traditions and institutions of the age have never been uprooted from Western civilization.

This new society unfortunately was not strong enough to resist the forces of decay and disintegration, and by the sixteenth century its life had been undermined. The autonomous national state was weakening its political coherence. Capitalist individualism was destroying its communal and corporative economy. A worldly clergy was alienating the laity. Arrogance of intellect and pride of spirit were preparing the rupture of religion into sects. Scholastic thought was losing its living assimilative powers, degenerating into a fixed pattern of knowledge and thus opening a dangerous chasm in the European mind between a stiff intellectual conservatism and the spirit of free inquiry. Humanist classicism was cutting loose from mediaeval tradition and therefore widening the cultural gulf between the learned and unlearned. The revived Roman law was destroying old institutions and liberties, creating a legal confusion for lawyers to batten on, and by its support of capitalism and the transformation of feudal tenure rights into property rights (thus assisting the general revolution of rich against poor) opening the way to social conflict.

Such developments broke the organic solidarity of mediaeval society, threw it into turmoil and war, and multiplied both the necessities and opportunities for the intervention of monarchical power in the crumbling social order. So violent were the convulsions of society from the fourteenth through the sixteenth century that mediaeval contractual monarchy tottered on its base and only survived by reconstructing itself upon absolutist foundations. This was dangerous for the future of monarchical institutions, but it was acceptable to the great mass of men as the only alternative to anarchy. And that they were right in this choice may be seen by contrasting Germany with the Western nations in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, for above all else it was the strong monarchies of the latter which spared them the fate that overtook Germany in the age of the Reformation and Thirty Years War.

I have called this reconstruction of monarchy upon absolutist foundations dangerous for the future of the institution, and my reasons for doing so should be plain. It had the effect of voiding the social contract and making mere force the ultimate foundation of political authority. This not only weakened the bond between prince and people, but led to the devising of a new and quite artificial sanction for authority in the doctrine of the divine right of kings; which rendered princes irresponsible and created temptations to slake an appetite for tyranny. And at the same time it bred a sycophantic, courtier spirit among princely counsellors. Thus kings grew distant from their peoples, and tended steadily to fall under the influence of advisers who often preferred to tell them what was pleasing to hear rather than the truth. In such circumstances the way was open for oligarchy to obtain the rule while the king merely reigned. That was the situation in Elizabethan England, and when Charles I tried to escape from it he lost his life. The unhappy fortunes of the Stuart family demonstrated very well the truth that monarchy cannot overcome class oligarchy without powerful support from an awakened and militant people; which support an absolutism is eventually required to forfeit.

In France the fate of the monarchy was somewhat different, but it also illustrates the ruinous consequences which must in the long run overtake monarchical absolutism. The French kings never succeeded in breaking free from the cumbersome and costly system which consumed the substance of the nation and provided a harvest for courtiers, lawyers, and bureaucrats until it went bankrupt and collapsed of its own weight, carrying the monarchy down with it. A really great king might have saved the crown had he broken through the old system and come to the rescue of his people, but the success of any such venture would have been highly doubtful, to say the least. For French society was in a most sorry condition. The country was rife with brigandage; the education of the people had been grossly neglected; religion was apparently dying among the middle classes; an ugly and bestial morality was widespread. The French people needed a saviour, yes, but they were not in a mood to accept one who came as a stern master; which was the only kind of saviour who could really save them. They had to go through the atrocities and perversions of the Revolution before they were ready to submit to Napoleon and thus end the long interregnum, which one might say had begun with the death of Louis XIV.

During the whole period from the close of the Middle Ages down to the French Revolution there took place no great and sweeping reconstruction of Western society. Rather it transpired that all of the destructive forces released in the mediaeval breakdown continued to operate; and that is the social side of the history of princely absolutism in the Christian nations of the West. There were not a few enlightened despots who conferred great benefits upon their peoples, but no determined will was exerted by a whole society to renew its life, restore contractual monarchy, and limit the area of state intervention in the social order. Yet without such voluntaristic social action, no other course was open to kings than abdication before an oligarchy or driving on the cumbersome machinery of state to the inevitable day of collapse.

IV

When the truths set forth above are borne in mind the real necessity and glory of the French Revolution are at last seen rightly. I know it is still the fashion among some rather thoughtless conservatives to condemn that Revolution along with all others; but if the doctrine of this essay is right, that conservative view is very wrong. I am not thinking of the crimes, the atheism, the overturn of all authority; rather am I thinking of the really solid content of the Revolution – its will to restore society: its stirring creed of Liberty, Equality, Fraternity. I am thinking of the Revolution as Mr. Belloc thought of it when, thirty-six years ago, he wrote:

> Wherever France went by, the Revolutionary Thing remained the legacy of her conviction and her power. It remains with a kind of iron laughter for those who judge the idea as a passing madness. The philosophers have decided upon a new philosophy; the lawyers have clearly proved that there has been no change; the rhetoric has been thoroughly laughed down, enthusiasm has grown ridiculous, and the men of action are cursed. But in the wake of the French march citizens are found who own the soil and are judged by an equal code of laws; nationalities have been welded, patriotism has risen at the call of the new patriotic creed. . . . Nor was there any abomination of the old decay, its tortures, its ignominies, its privileges, its licensed insults, or its slaveries, but she utterly stamped them out.

That is more than rhetoric; St. Louis was justified of his sons even though they knew not their father.

The creed of Rousseau and the Revolution, purged of its errors, was the creed of European humanity struggling for a new vindication of its traditions and its rights. And that is the reason why, in spite of the terror and tyranny, the crimes of the Jacobins, the defeat of Napoleon and eventual return of old reigning families, a great hope and faith lived on in the hearts of nineteenth-century men – until, at length, they sensed the great betrayal. And that betrayal consisted in this: the revolutionary freedom was used by the plutocrats to set up a new class tyranny – to revive feudalism in the modern dress of capitalistic liberalism, but every wit as predatory as the older feudalism that was dead. Thus the great return to nature ended in millions of men being condemned to live lives more grossly unnatural than before Rousseau and Shelley, Jefferson and Whitman, dreamed their dreams. The mystical democrats of the Revolution had come to honour and praise man, but by the end of the nineteenth century man was being pitied rather than honoured and despised rather than praised. The great humanistic tradition of Western civilization seemed at last to be dying away, and until almost our own times it was still going down. The failure of that great hope made men very bitter, and vast numbers of them turned away from demanding the rights of man to asking for mere bread, security, leisure, and amusement. The great betrayal of the Revolution resulted, indeed, in a corruption so great that today all really fundamental social critics do not stop short of insisting that a veritably new man must be made.

But fortunately it is now plain that there is not sufficient reason for the adherents of the Christian-humanist tradition to despair. Western man, to be sure, must be made anew, but that renewal is a work of restoration; it is a work of returning Western man to his roots in religion and traditional sanities, of bringing him to drink anew at the old springs of his distinctively human culture. There is ground for hope that this revolutionary restoration may indeed be achieved, for it is winning great battles in the Old World, and in our own country is capturing strategic positions, even the White House itself. And the truth of the matter seems to be that only a clear recognition of the near presence of a great enemy can stir very many men to answer the tocsin call. That enemy today is the cold monster of the Godless, servile, bureaucratic, absolute state, directed by men cut loose from traditional culture, and consuming not merely the product of man's labour but the very choicest fruits of Christian-humanist civilization.

As long as men do not recognize the thing for what it is, they ignore it, or even promote its advent because they are deluded into thinking it an instrument of social justice. How many thousands of men there are today who call themselves socialists simply because, being humanitarian liberals with a conscience surviving from Christian moral traditions, they naïvely believe that the socialist state can bring the good life to the great mass of men! But when these and all others who care about the welfare of their fellow-men once glimpse the full cultural meaning of the thing – when they once grasp the immensity of the stakes of the struggle – they will turn upon and rend it. That is at once the meaning and the hope of the mad Hitlerian fury vented upon Central European Bolshevism, for there all men actually felt the clammy touch of the monster upon their shoulders. Perhaps they have not yet really slain it, but in spite of all their crimes they have at least strengthened our hope that Western man is still capable of hating an evil thing. And therefore although the monster may triumph for a time, as it has in what was once called Holy Russia, there is good reason to believe that Western man will break it in the end. Yes, there is reason for the traditional Christian humanist to hope. Embers of reason and sanity are shooting forth flames again from what seemed a dead, cold fire. Winds of timeless doctrine are blowing through the Western mind, and man is showing again that he possesses a will. Modern apostasies are being recanted, and in the disintegrating social order there is a new order struggling to arise.

If and when it does arise it cannot but bring with it a restoration of right authority, for as I pointed out earlier in this essay that has been a mark of all past social restoration. Just as the popular awakening of the Middle Ages assailed feudalism and anarchy by raising up the contractual kings, so did the French Revolution raise up the crowned democracy of Napoleon; and not the least cause for the degeneration of the Revolution into middle-class liberalism and social decay was the fall of that splendid democrat. The new revolution of restoration under way today must pick up that fallen crown. For its whole secular meaning is the revival of liberty, equality, and fraternity, defended by order, authority, and justice.

V

If what I have said in this essay on the causal relationship between tyranny and social decay is true, it is very evident that the new authoritarian state which is emitting its birth-cry in our times must undertake a radical social mission if it is to escape the crimes and fate of its predecessors; and that social mission cannot but prove both difficult and hazardous. It will be difficult because it must involve a policy aiming at the creation of an independent and largely self-regulating society; that is to say, its power must be used toward securing social conditions in which the necessity for state intervention is reduced. Politicians and jobholders now consuming the substance of the nation must be diminished in number the while the state is kept strong, popular, and free of either plutocratic or proletarian control; which means that government will gradually have to stop doing for people what they can do for themselves through voluntary individual or corporative action. The dangers involved in such a social mission are exceedingly great. It will provoke enemies to a fiercely energetic opposition, and measures will be required for disarming them. Charges of tyranny, violence, and blind reaction will be made, and especially because this policy cannot but require a political attack in the intellectual and cultural spheres of social life.

A sincere pursuit of this radical social mission indeed means that the state must slough off the *economic* character that it has steadily been assuming under both plutocracy and socialism, and become again supremely *political* and *military*, concerned primarily with the defence of human values rather than the supplying of economic wants and functions for its citizens. I do not mean, of course, that it must return to a laissez-faire policy in the economic order — far from that. Rather I mean that it must adhere strictly to the task of policing society against predatory and corrupting enemies of every stripe; which work involves the laying down of rules for right conduct in all departments of social activity (within the limits of secular jurisdiction) and the strict enforcement of those rules. Politics, in short, will have to be recognized for what it actually is, namely, a branch of ethics; and the political power must carry on an action that defends the whole common good. Any other course than this means the piling up of bureaucracy, impoverishment of society by taxation, failure in the end of the police power, and certain ultimate breakdown of the state. The error of both liberal-democracy and socialism is to fuse state and society into a complex tangle of business and politics, confusing economic activity with political administration and finally crippling both. This Gordian knot must be cut by the new state. Under no circumstances whatever must it compromise with expediency by attempting short cuts toward the goal of social well-being through enlargement of bureaucratic action, since this cannot but mean final defeat for its social mission, no matter how zealously that mission is pursued. For the penalty of this error is that a time must come when the whole energies of the government will be absorbed by its own problems, in keeping a political system operating; and when that time comes the end is in sight. There is but one justification for dallying with bureaucracy and that is the maintenance of those social services which common morals require for the sake of living generations in the present dislocated society.

From the foregoing it is clear enough that the test of rightness in the social policy of the new state is the extent to which that policy makes for a widely distributed ownership, control, and operation of the means of economic production; since the autonomy of individuals and corporate groups depends finally upon the ownership of productive property. This essay cannot include an exploration of this hard and thorny question, but I do not wish to end it by suggesting (as those who mock at the "New Mediaevalists" would accuse me of suggesting) that modern technology must be scrapped to make way for a crude revival of handicraft economics. The machine must be attacked, yes, but the aim of the attack must be conquest, not destruction. A way must be found, and I believe can be found, for decentralizing autocratic industrial organization into freely co-operating units, each capable of a wide self-determination and a real self-defence. And the principle must be fought for, that no matter how competent a machine may be, what is really wanted is a tool for man's creative hand, not a substitute for his job. The application of that principle, I have little doubt, will mean the condemnation, as detrimental to human welfare, of many machines in those finishing trades which turn out cheap and tawdry goods destructive of the market for products of quality and debasing to good standards of taste. There are probably a great many machines that we could wisely dispense with on such high social grounds, and where it may be expedient and desirable to do so the state will have to strike at them with the tax weapon. Nobody thinks it unintelligent for the state to suppress the free traffic in machine guns or slot machines; if and when the state resumes its high political mission as the supreme guardian of temporal society, it will not appear unintelligent to regulate the trade and use of other machines as well. Such action might appear economically backward from the narrow point of view of the mere business man; it would not really be so, but even if it were that would be a small price to pay for avoiding the servile bureaucratic state, which modern industrial society otherwise makes inevitable.

Such an economic and social policy, energetically pursued by a state become again genuinely political, and backed strongly by a people determined to make a free society, is the one hope for breaking the impasse confronting Western society. It is the one hope for a reasonable measure of social justice, the one way leading to security but not ending in tyranny. I do not know whether leaders sufficiently wise and virtuous to steer this course successfully will be vouchsafed us, and one may well doubt if indeed we are worthy of them. A harder task lies ahead than that which the mediaeval kings sought to accomplish. But it is no longer possible to doubt that our salvation lies in no other effort than this.

This Is the Place!

The Mormons and the Land

R. L. Burgess

THE *Deseret News*, Salt Lake evening journal owned by the Mormon Church, runs daily in the upper left-hand corner of its first page these words: "This is the place." They were first spoken by Brigham Young in 1847 when his pilgrims arrived in the promised land of Utah after their famous journey across half a continent. Three years after he had uttered them, the *Deseret News* was founded by the Saints, and it has never ceased for eighty-four years to remind the Chosen People that they dwell upon sacred ground. Any sensitive Gentile, rightly considering the simple words, must for a moment half regret that he is outside that magic circle of holiness the centre of which is the many-towered Temple topped by the golden archangel whose trumpet is yet to be heard in all four corners of the earth.

"This is the place" at first seems no better phrase than that which any booster of any aspiring town in the American West might adopt as his slogan. It scarcely seems so impressive at first glance as, let us say, the *Pocatello Tribune's* asseveration that "Loyalty to Idaho Institutions Builds Idaho". Yet viewed in the light of Salt Lake religious tradition the words are lovely as the long shadows cast by the mountains overlooking the city of the Saints. One comes to feel that here civic pride, so common in the West, is grown dignified, sacrosanct.

What rootless American, wandering over the states in airplane, automobile, or Pullman car, does not envy for a moment the Salt Lake patriot? For at the end of a painful day's struggle with the problems of a pioneer country sick with civilization he can pick up his evening paper, which his father took before him, with some confidence that he will be soothed. He will be reminded with quiet unction, as the vast Wasatch Range looms in the sunset like Nature's own prototype of that golden archangel upon the Temple, that THIS IS THE PLACE, the very site of the Delphic Oracle, navel of the earth, his heart's true home.

II

Indeed Joseph Smith, Moses of this people, who wrote for them their sacred epic, and Brigham Young the Joshua who enacted it, did mightily labour and bring forth a Temple not made with hands, far lovelier than the material one surmounted by the gilded seraph. For here, although it was so recently imposed upon this desert, upon these saturnine mountains, this Dead Sea of a lake, is a folk tradition already deep and urgent. It holds before mature men the solemn hope of living as befits leaders of the tribe who may yet be hailed by the glorious name of Apostle. It touches young men and women with the solace that comes of abiding from youth up within a Way that is good and acceptable unto the Lord.

It is useless to visit the older settlements of Utah if you fail to discover that in each one of them there was lived for a time at least in the presence of these mountains and within the communal structure of the Church of the Latter Day Saints of Jesus Christ the kind of life which Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace holds forth as an aspiration for all of us under the New Deal:

> Many of the most lively, intimate expressions of spirit [says Mr. Wallace] spring from the joyous, continuous contact of human beings with a particular locality. They feel the age-long spirit of this valley or that hill each with its trees and rocks and special tricks of weather, as the seasons unfold in their endless charm. If life can be made secure in each community and if the rewards of the different communities are distributed justly, there will flower in every community not only those who attain joy in daily, productive work well done; but also those who paint and sing and tell stories peculiar to their own valley, well-loved hill, or broad prairie. And so we think of co-operative communities not merely in a competent commercial sense but also from the standpoint of people who are helping unfold each other's lives in terms of the physical locality and tradition of which they are a part. In this way, every community can become something distinctly precious in its own right. Children will not try to escape as they grow up. They will look ahead to the possibility of enriching the traditions of their ancestors.

It is true that not many dwellers at the foot of the Wasatches in Salt Lake Valley have arisen to "paint and sing and tell stories peculiar to their own valley" and well-loved hills. But eighty-seven years is a short time in which to produce the delicate flower of art from a desert. And before the old pastoral and agrarian holiness of Utah could legitimately be expected to bring forth that blossom, it encountered that necessity for making agriculture a modern industry shrewdly adjusted to a changing world which put

Secretary Wallace at the head of a great enterprise. Besides, in the agony of passing from the old ways of David the shepherd king to the subtleties of Solomon there may yet appear artists among the Saints. If so, they will as surely set grave and beautiful images against this mighty natural background as the artists of a defeated agrarian South persuaded us that chivalry breathed its last in the gentler riverscape of the James and the Chattahoochee.

The task of these hypothetical spokesmen of the desert will be a harder one, for the war which brought the old Utah to the new division of spirit was not dramatically localized upon the waters of this inland sea. It was thousands of miles away in an alien land. But if you attend one of the many agricultural adjustment conferences held by Mr. Wallace's Department of Agriculture in Salt Lake because it is roughly equidistant from San Francisco, Los Angeles, Denver, and Spokane, you cannot but feel the contrast between the old archangel's resurrection trumpet and the efficiently planned horn of plenty discussed at these conclaves. For if in the course of time Utah has become a recognized American State, with conventional paraphernalia of Governor and Legislature and with Senators lobbying for high tariffs on the wool grown by faithful Republicans for decades past, she has also throughout the years unto this day remained a mystical commonwealth, a theocracy inspiring awe which underlies all the casual jesting at her expense. The State Capitol's dome, placed on a foothill well above the level of the city's common activities, yet far beneath the immense parapets of the Wasatch Range, seems to typify the place which earthly statehood must hold in the hearts of citizens wise enough to be a little fanatical in their devotion to all that is typified by the fantastic Eagle Gate. For this structure, which once stood at the entrance of Brigham Young's estate, is now the dubious adornment of the street leading up to the Capitol.

With what peace of spirit – and there is never peace until there is a holy pride – might one stand expecting the traffic signal at this gate! One would look up so contentedly, if within the charmed circle of belief in this god of a region, at the dome of the Capitol there on the hill, at the electroplated eagle on the gate nearby, and the Temple's towers above the lay buildings between. And one would murmur so confidently: "This is the place, we are the People, He is our God, and there is none else beside."

This brings to mind another phrase which is almost as impressive as the statement published so faithfully by the *Deseret News* on its first page. For it seems that when a labour union sought to organize workers for an establishment belonging to the Church, the heads of the establishment said a memorable thing to the young men who wished to join. They said: "You belong to the Church – the Church is enough."

The Church is enough! That, coupled with the phrase already cited, expresses so thoroughly the naïve flattery man pays to his tribe and his territory! To believe that his group is sacred, and that its dwelling place is the one predestined spot where that group's virtues can best be shown forth – how vital to a man are those twin dogmas! They are the foundations of states, the causes of wars, and the last solace unrolled before a faithful eye as it finally darkens.

Great is the struggle which goes on in the heart of a young man admonished by apostles and elders in those two grand phrases, yet suspecting all the while that there is some reason, deeper than any brought forth in controversy, why he must align himself with the labour union, this new brotherhood taking impersonal non-territorial economics as its home and theme. On the one side is his loyalty to the old territorial tribe symbolized by that agrarian fetish of soil fertility and human fertility, the Mormon Patriarch of Heaven, God of Gods. On the other side is this younger dream of brethren uniting to crush exploiters unconsciously masquerading as saintly leaders of the flock when in reality, shout the labour-union organizers, they are old Republican bell-wethers – sometimes thinly disguised as New Dealers – alluring their sheep to the slaughter.

Consider one young man in Salt Lake. He is the son of one of the Church potentates. Not long ago this young man returned from a Church mission to Europe. As he visited Paris and London, proclaiming the evangel which descended miraculously upon Joseph Smith in the "burnt-over area" of New York State swept by so many religious fervours, did heretical doubt ever enter his mind as to whether this Utah desert was the place and this jejune ecclesiasticism the sufficiency for which the entire human race must inevitably long? And now that he is back home once more, shall he be expected confidently to join the labour union, or shall he comport himself as one of those described by Secretary Wallace: "Children will not try to escape as they grow up. They will look ahead to the possibility of enriching the traditions of their ancestors"? Or shall he be looked upon tenderly as a tragic little specimen of a soul at the crossroads, struggling to justify the ways of the old gods to man and at the same time to go along with his contemporaries toward this new dream of the divinity of man's own immediate aspirations?

III

The very name of the *Deseret News* has sacred significance. One man on the paper, asked what the name meant, said: "It is from the Book of Mormon – 'deseret' means 'bee'. You have noticed the beehive at the masthead of our paper, and on monuments around town. Well, the beehive means a good deal to the Mormons." And an official of the rival paper said not long ago, when the name "Deseret" disappeared from a bank's name because of a merger: "It seems a pity to have the old name go."

This tempering of business instinct by religious sentiment occurs again and again. One Mormon business man, discussing the agricultural adjustment programme, said: "I am a New Dealer, and believe that it was necessary to plow under some cotton and wheat as an emergency measure. But I want to say that the laying of strong hands on wheat did shock some of us as Mormons. Perhaps you don't quite understand our feeling about wheat. It isn't just a business crop with us. My mother, for instance, belonged for many years to a relief society of the Church people which gathered wheat and stored it for the poor. Not money, but the good grain itself. And during the War, when there was such a shortage of wheat, the Mormon people felt that their old practice had been justified."

In this man's way of speaking of such things, and in that of other Mormon men of affairs, one detects an odd mixture of pride and deprecation. They seem to be trying to signal: "You and I are men of the world, and there is accordingly a secret understanding between us that my Mormonism is not to be accounted all of me." But always there was that unspoken pride as well. As one man talked with a Gentile about the establishment he managed, he was asked who or what corporation was the owner, and he partly lowered, partly closed his eyes as he replied softly: "The Church." He was deprecatory because he and the Gentile were colleagues in the enterprise of running this world's affairs, and this world isn't on the whole the property of a church. But it was only when he looked outward, toward the Gentile, that this tone was necessary. When he half shut his eyes, and looked inward, and saw the Chosen People beautiful and triumphant against the background of their mighty desert, what dreams, what visions, what beloved reassurances, did this transformed man of the world perceive?

Naturally, a Gentile cannot know in specific detail the answer to this question. But even the most trifling knowledge of other mythologies teaches one how eye-filling, how heart-satisfying must be those inward pictures to which this Mormon is able to turn. How true it is, as Joseph Smith averred, that these myths were brought to him by an angel from heaven, engraved in mystical characters upon plates of gold! Deseret the Bee, and the redskins of the West who so interestingly turned out to be the Lost Tribes of Israel, and that great seraph Moroni who moves through the memories of this people of a Book, and the flight from burning Nauvoo toward the bosom of God over the immeasurable wilderness, and then the sacred revelation at the foot of the mighty Wasatches that "this is the place", and the consequent rising of a civilization like a rose in the desert once the water had been diverted from those mountains to these sands, and then the good women gleaning literal wheat for the poor, and, spreading surely year by year over this fantastic novelty of landscape, the settled sense of authority, of dear tradition, of desert, mountains, and mysterious lake coalescing with the phantasmagoria unrolled in the holy Book – surely here are inward visions which one somewhat weary man of the world might envy in another as they talked over the government's corn-hog programme!

The effort to stand well in the world's opinion and at the same time to hold fast by the inward vision that this is the place and the Church is enough, varies of course in the proportions of the two ingredients from region to region and from person to person. In Salt Lake itself, at the very centre of the theocracy, as has already been indicated, are men capable of smiling as they let Caesar take away from the deity some few small coins of deference or deprecation. Yet again, far from the sacred capital city, in the midst of unbelievers, one will find some good woman of the tribe of Saints, as straitly convinced that tea, coffee, and tobacco are works of the devil and that only the Chosen People are saved, as though she were a dedicated member of Brigham Young's own patriarchal household. When such an one weds, she must be clad in that mystical garment of the Mormon bride, so often mentioned, sometimes jestingly, sometimes with half-envious reverence, by all Gentiles who have dwelt among this people dear unto the Lord. Again, far from the home Temple, one will find a whole settlement living devoutly as the Book dictated from behind curtains in Palmyra, N. Y., by Joe Smith, would have them live. Some years ago a high government official visited a Southern Nevada Mormon community, and was so impressed by the simple kindliness and hospitality, the unabashed naïveté of these folk, that he spoke of it again and again afterwards with tears in his eyes. He had supped with Abram and Sara and the angels before a tent in the land east of Eden. His heart was haunted by the old nostalgia for simpler ways and days which comes upon city men when they behold country folk moving in their appropriate setting with the decorum of dolls in archaic dress solemnly shifted by the hands of an earnest child.

That vision which the government official caught for a moment is one which all Westerners and all Americans interested in agriculture need to catch and hold close to their hearts for longer than a moment. For if you wish to perceive both the beauty and the outmodedness of the old tradition of the soil, you may see them best embodied in the grave, quaint figure of the Mormon.

God led the Old World farmer out across a New World desert and told him here in Salt Lake at the foot of these mountains near this strange inland sea haunted by the ocean pelican: "This is the place. Here you are permitted to express one more time – before the changes now destined make another such incarnation impossible — the ancient dream of agrarian man that all men, avowedly and prayerfully suckling the earth as their mother, may live very near one to the other in body and in soul, one great brotherhood so deeply satisfactory and inclusive that again and again they shall say, 'The Church is enough!' "

The Mormon was obedient unto this God he had created to guide him from Illinoïs to Utah. He poured water from the mountains and sweat from his brow upon the soil of this lofty table-land which has ever made him seem, for all his tariff-hoisting Republicanism, a second David tending sheep upon the highlands of a loftier Judea beside a grander Dead Sea. And from the provincial citadel of this David, the shepherd princes of this mysteriously beautiful land have spread marvelously over the vast intermountain and desert regions of our American West. One finds them in Arizona, in Nevada, in Idaho, in eastern Washington and Oregon, in southern California, wherever the sun burns down like the eye of deity upon treeless empires waiting only the touch of water and of human faith to make them bloom and come to harvest.

This vast realm was geographically the bulk of the Far West, and the Mormon was spiritually its true centre so long as industry was the subordinate partner of agriculture. Other faiths nominally Christian as is Mormonism had become urbanized and emasculated, had worn smooth in the hands of city traders. But here was a faith naïve enough, crude enough, if you will, to voice the ancient farmer once more as he pressed forward over the desert of time to his final submergence in the tide of city machinery. A desert setting for a desert religion — not since Mahomet had there been juncture more apposite. It is true that Joseph Smith was not literally a desert dweller. But consider the fantastic mental desert within his head. Consider both Joseph Smith and John Brown – the very commonplaceness of their names bespeaks deserts of social mediocrity – simple souls with no weight of old civilization upon them. Merely the ceaseless pressure upon their confused brains of this old skull-bone of a Bible, peopling their mind's wilderness with stark figures of prophets and avenging angels destined to spring to physical life later in the waiting physical desert of the American West. John Brown poured blood upon his mental desert, and in the New West of that day which we now call the Old South one of the world's great wars blossomed, mystical rose of sorrow and redemption, bearing as later buds General Grant, Henry Ford, the ultimate collapse of Lincolnian industrialism, and the ironic transformation of remnants of Jefferson Davis's party into champions of the New Deal. Joseph Smith poured blood upon *his* mental desert, and raised up Brigham Young, who transformed it to literal desert conquered by literal fertility of the tended soil and of the seed of man guided into the broad channels of patriarchal family arrangements. And for decades, after the first brief period of persecution was over, the Republican success-doctrine flourished as naturally on these fresh highlands as did the Confederate defeat-threnody on the lowlands of the South. But now, already confused by long prosperity which more and more had an industrial basis while they went on dreaming it was purely agrarian-religious, Smith's and Young's folk are bewildered by brief poverty and turn hesitantly and with much painful searching of the heart toward that New Deal so little discussed on the tablets of gold inscribed by the angel.

And there is no setting for the final act of the antique agrarian drama which could be more fitting than this desert upland of Utah, with its mystical sterile lake shining like quicksilver in the very name of the capital city. Look at these amazing mountains in the evening as they stare so glumly at the serene ocean of salt, and you see how the mind of the Mormon farmer, convinced of the sacredness of his mission, seized masterfully upon the wandering seagull which devoured the grasshoppers threatening the wheat fields, and transformed that ordinary bird into a stone symbol of the providence of God. For here all is so barren, so gigantic, unless the magic of living creatures quells it, that the slightest movement of man or beast or bird acquires hieratic beauty, and becomes as it were an image fit to bear in a sacred procession as a sign of man's destiny in the face of death.

Here, then, the farmer as the Old World has so long known him, as the wandering Israelites found him when they entered the land of Canaan, as he was under Augustus, Charlemagne, and Frederick the Great, made his last stand and became a disillusioned watchdog of the wool tariff, pawn upon world markets, flotsam upon universal and impersonal tides of social change. Here now he becomes a New Dealer, industrializing his economics to fit an actuality industrialized long since, but again and again pausing to make his vain protest that this is a holy place and that the sacred brotherhood of tillers and herdsmen must never forget the God of flocks and fields.

Private Property and the Monetary Problem

HERBERT AGAR

PEOPLE like Mr. Hoover and the members of the Liberty League defend finance-capitalism in the name of private property. Since finance-capitalism is a system which makes real property so private that hardly anyone can hope to have any, the defence is unfortunate. It increases no man's respect for finance-capitalism, but it decreases many men's respect for property. The public naturally comes to feel that if this which is taking place around them is really a system of private property then there must be something to be said for communism. It is the old story that if good words are used to defend bad causes the words are debauched; the causes are never improved in the least.

Similarly, the friends of our traditional money-system (the system, for example, of the Coolidge-Hoover years) defend it on the ground that it was a "gold-standard" system, hence that our money was "sound", that it was redeemable in something that had intrinsic value, in the days before Mr. Roosevelt and his rubber. This is quite as great a fraud as is the defence of finance-capitalism in the name of private property. And it is a harder fraud to combat, for the average man's ideas about our money mechanism are so vague that they are almost invulnerable. Before you can hope to change his opinions you have first to teach him what he thinks he thinks and why he is supposed to think it. Anyone who has ever tried this difficult job will welcome Mr. Groseclose's book,* which presents our modern money-system with beautiful clarity by relating it to a brief outline of monetary history.

The question of money-systems is important to all who favour the restoration of real property. Just as no money system can add a farthing to a nation's real wealth, but a bad money system can tangle up a nation's real wealth and make it partly unavailable, so no money system can in itself create a good society, but a bad money-system may easily prevent such a society from coming into being. There is reason to fear that our present system is bad enough to do exactly this. It is a perfect reflection of the moral and intellectual chaos that are the fruits of a century of progress. It will have to be improved before a saner world can be built. And before it can be improved it will have to be understood.

Mr. Groseclose begins his book by pointing out that man's boasted control over nature has never yet extended to control over his own creation, money:

> The same four years [he writes] which witnessed the penetration of the stratosphere, the inauguration of air mail service across the Atlantic, the broadcasting of metropolitan opera, the streamlining of automobiles, and the invention of a superior can-opener, witnessed the failure of the Credit-Anstalt, a pawnshop scandal in France, the suicide of Kreuger, and the flight of Insull; and of the two sets of events, those which grew out of the financial activities of the world were far more immediate to the hopes and fears of mankind. . . .

---

* MONEY: THE HUMAN CONFLICT *by Elgin Groseclose* (UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA PRESS. 304 pp. $3.25).

Whatever might have been the dreams, prior to these events, of a Utopian world designed by the philosopher and built to the plumb rule of the engineer, they became metamorphosed into the nightmare of a mad struggle for bread for the masses and work for the unemployed. . . . Biologists may control the growth of microscopic bacteria in a culture; engineers, the power of exploding dynamite; electricians, the radiations in the ether, but no one has succeeded in controlling money.

Mr. Groseclose's book is an explanation of why no one has succeeded in controlling money, and also of why modern man has made an especially bad botch of his money-system.

II

It was in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries that the modern money-system was born. Mr. Groseclose chooses as the date of birth the years when the older banking institutions "founded upon the honourable concept of the inviolability of funds left on deposit" gave way to a new type of banking "based, in England, upon the unprincipled practices of the goldsmiths, and fostered by the deceptive theories and practices of John Law in France". A feature of the modern system is that credit-money, *i.e.*, debt, becomes the chief form of money used by society, with the result that coinage, and the problems connected with coinage, become steadily of smaller importance. And a more surprising feature is that the general public, for two centuries, has remained ignorant of this fact, continuing to the present day to think that "money" means either bank-notes or metal coins. The insignificance of metal or paper money, when compared with credit-money, which is drawn upon by check, is suggested by the following figures. In 1929, the ratio of cash to total bank deposits was 11.3 per cent in the United Kingdom, 7.4 per cent in France, and 7.3 per cent in the United States. In 1930, bank deposits in the United States were $42,996,000,000. In the same year, bank notes amounted to $698,000,000.

A beautiful illustration of the way in which, under the "Gold Exchange Standard", the creation of at least nine-tenths of a nation's money had become a private monopoly, is found in Mr. Groseclose's condensation of an example from Madden and Nadler's *Foreign Securities:*

> An Austrian corporation has issued a long-term loan in New York, the net proceeds of which are $1,000,000. The corporation, which needs *schillings*, has sold the proceeds of the loan to a Viennese bank. The latter in turn has sold the credit with the banks in New York to the Austrian national bank. This has increased the "metallic reserve" of the latter, and enabled it to increase its notes in circulation or demand deposits by about $3,000,000 or about 21,000,000 *schillings*, assuming a reserve ratio of 33.33 per cent (the legal requirement was actually lower). As these notes or deposits were in turn reserves for the commercial banks, commercial credit of three or four times this amount could be created.
>
> The loan to the Austrian corporation of $1,000,000 resulted in an equal increase in deposits on the books of the New York bank with which the proceeds of the loan were deposited. Against this deposit the New York bank had to maintain a reserve with the Federal Reserve Bank of 13 per cent, or $130,000. The latter in turn was required to maintain a reserve of 35 per cent against its deposits,

or $45,500. Thus, under the gold-exchange-standard system, against an actual gold reserve of less than $50,000 in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, a central bank operating on the gold exchange standard was able to increase its notes in circulation or demand deposits by about $3,000,000, upon which, in turn, the commercial banks could build a deposit credit structure of $10,000,000 to $12,000,000.

This is what is known as "economy in the use of gold". It is also, oddly enough, known as a form of the gold standard. It is known as "sound money" – the sort of money with which only cranks would want to "monkey". In plain fact, it is a vicious fraud. It is an elaborate system for complicating the problem to the point where the average man cannot possibly understand what is happening, where he can be fooled into thinking that his money is really convertible into gold.

Perhaps, as some economists think, a money which is really convertible into gold is best for society. Perhaps, as others hold, the best system is a purely conventional, completely "managed" currency. The one thing that cannot be best, that cannot even be good, is a system that calls itself one thing and is really another. For a long time our so-called "sound" money has been convertible into gold only so long as nobody wanted to convert it; it has been quite inconvertible as soon as there was any large demand for conversion. As Mr. Groseclose says, "If money is intrinsic, and deposits are to be really representative of actual money left with bankers, then it is legerdemain and duplicity of the rankest sort continually to reduce the amount of money available to meet calls from depositors. If, however, money is purely conventional, then there is no need whatsoever of gold reserves, and it is fraud practised upon the public to lead it to believe that money is intrinsic and supported by gold."

> Money [writes Mr. Groseclose], as we survey its modern development, is nothing more than debt — a vast structure of lead thinly veneered with gold. What men accept for their daily toil and for the product of the field or workbench is not a tangible substance endowed with intrinsic value, but an evidence of debt. In this country, in England, and to a smaller degree in other countries, this evidence of debt consists of deposit credit, the obligation of a bank to pay out a certain sum of money on demand. Elsewhere, in less developed countries, the paper note of the government serves the same purpose. . . .
>
> Our system of money based on debt has destroyed one of the principal functions of money — that of serving as a store of value. At the same time that it has aggravated the business cycle, by encouraging speculation, it has made it almost impossible to build up reserves against the day of inevitable collapse. Under our system of money, it is well-nigh hopeless for the average man to save against a rainy day. For savings, under our scheme, are not reserves: they are used by the banking system, they are spent in the capital markets, and when they are needed, they are discovered to be immobilized, to be invested in bonds and loans the value of which is dependent upon the continuation of prosperity.
>
> The effects of this process are made clearer by analogy to a householder whose barn is destroyed in a storm. If he has a golden guinea saved away, he may rebuild his barn. But under the system of deposit money, in which money is representative, not of gold, but of . . . debt, the barn is also his money, and when it is gone, his money is gone. Stated more definitely, when national calamity

strikes, be it the result of economic maladjustments, physical disaster, or war, purchasing power, if money is sound and substantial, is always available for rebuilding, for taking up market surpluses, for discharging debt. But deposit money floats with the tide. Being based upon debt, it becomes worthless when any considerable body of bank customers are no longer able to discharge their obligations.

Elsewhere, Mr. Groseclose speaks of "the fiction of bank credit", which he defines as

> the attempt to rank with money, as purchasing power, as media of exchange, as something fluid and universally acceptable, something which is essentially illiquid, limited in scope, and with a value resting upon a thousand intangibles — the debts of the community, legal instruments which at best are but subordinated ownerships in physical wealth the value of which arises from its utility to narrow groups, from constant husbandry, and from momentary concatenations of events. A loan upon warehoused wheat, for instance, which supports the credit created by a bank, is a subordinated interest in the wheat itself, which does not give title or possession except under a set of circumstances defined by law and contract. . . . To cut through the mass of documentation in the form of warehouse receipts, notes, deposit slips, and checks which becloud the true character of the bank credit, we find that what is actually serving as money is a bag of wheat, a substance which is of no value to a rice-eating Hindu as a medium of payment in exchange for tea or jute, and of scarcely more value as a pay-check to a Wall Street clerk.

The common defence for the widespread modern use of debt-money is that unless this system had been evolved, the nineteenth century would have seen less progress. The defence may have sounded sensible in 1910; it is certainly not worth refuting today. All we need do now is notice that the money-system is as unstable as the economic order which it helped create, that they are both on the way out, and that we must find saner systems to replace them. So far as the economic order is concerned. Distributists know what they want to see take the place of the anarchy of finance-capitalism. But what about the money-system for a Distributist state? The problem has barely been broached, and it is a vital problem.

Mr. Groseclose's book should make the main outlines of the problem clear.* The first question to face is whether a Distributist state should aim to have intrinsic money or a purely managed currency, for there can be no doubt that the present vague and dishonest combination of the two systems will have to go. Mr. Groseclose admits that a managed currency is theoretically ideal. Few economists, even among the most conservative, would deny that. For example, the great Professor Alfred Marshall, founder of the modern Cambridge school of economists, wrote as follows:

> It has often been suggested that the supply of a nation's currency itself might ultimately be so adjusted as to fix the purchasing power of each unit of the currency to an absolute standard. In spite of the severe criticism to which this suggestion has been subjected, there seems no good ground for regarding it as wholly impracticable: but many long and tedious studies, stretching perhaps over several

---

* *NOTE.* Mr. Groseclose's book is of course a simplification of one of the most complicated problems known to man. Anyone wishing to go a little further into the difficulties of money-theory would do well to read *What Everybody Wants to Know About Money*, by Nine Economists from Oxford, planned and edited by G. D. H. Cole, 1933. Though written for the general reader, this book makes no concessions to ignorance or laziness.

generations; and many tentative experiments moving cautiously toward the ideal goal, would need to be taken before any large venture in this direction could properly be made.

This cautious view seems to be shared by Mr. Groseclose, who goes out of his way to emphasize how previous attempts to manage currency have merely demonstrated man's deficiencies of mind and character. "In an ideal state of society . . .", he writes, "the intrinsic quality of money might entirely disappear, and be replaced by the value derived from the control of the state. But for that to occur, the control of the state would need be perfect in authority and god-like in intelligence." But what is the alternative? If we abandon the present system, in which money is really based on credit, *i.e.*, debt, while the common man is fooled into believing that it is based on metal – if we abandon that system, and if we turn our back on managed currency, there is nothing left but money with a real metallic basis. The actual money in daily use would be paper, but the paper would be issued at a one-to-one ratio with gold or silver reserves. Such a system, of course, would provide an inflexible currency. And an inflexible currency means an unstable price level. As society's real wealth in goods and services increases, prices must fall unless the currency can be increased step by step with the goods and services.

In the past, an unstable price-level has been seen as one of the worst evils that could result from a bad money-system. But Mr. Groseclose points out, fairly enough, that the reason for this view was that society was burdened with a long-term debt. In a debt-ridden society, falling prices must ruin the producer. But, says Mr. Groseclose, a society that has a stable money of intrinsic value need not be a debt-ridden society:

> The question [he writes] as to what will happen to the price structure when industrial and agricultural production begins to outstrip new gold production may also be dismissed. Under the theory of quantitative money, the price level would fall. The answer to this is that it should fall. If goods are becoming more abundant than the means to buy them, the price should come down. The great fallacy of current thinking is the sacredness of the price level. The only thing that renders the price level sacrosanct is the existence of debt. Reduce the importance of debt in the scheme of things and the problem of a stable price level will take care of itself.

So Mr. Groseclose becomes an ardent champion of genuine gold money. His suggestion for "reducing the importance of debt in the scheme of things" is similar to that which has been proposed by Professor Soddy:

> It would mean [writes Mr. Groseclose], the divorcement of credit from the money mechanism, the cessation, or practical cessation, of the use of credit instruments as media of exchange. It would mean a great reduction in the liquidity and transferability of wealth. It would mean the disappearance of the most insidious form of fictitious credit. We could still have investment banking, providing credit at long term, and bill brokers and finance companies, providing credit for short term; but such credit would not be the transfer of a fictitious purchasing power drawn from the reservoirs of a banking system whose own sources derive from the use of the bank check; the credit available would be true credit, that is, the transfer of actual, existing wealth in exchange for wealth to be created and returned at a future time. Such credit would not be

inflationary, as is bank credit, for every dollar made available as purchasing power to the borrower would be the result of the abstinence from the exercise of purchasing power on the part of the lender: it would be merely the transfer of purchasing power, not the creation of purchasing power by fiction.

This "great reduction in the liquidity and transferability of wealth" would not, I think, be practical in the world of finance-capital. But in the less complicated Distributist state it might prove practical. There is no question that an intrinsic money gives the average man, the small property-holder of the Distributist state, a greater independence, a greater power of resistance, than he could have in a state whose money depended on the accuracy and honesty of a distant board of managers. For this reason, any argument in favour of a gold money deserves careful thought.

Mr. Groseclose never loses sight of the fact that behind the money-problem there is always the problem of morals, the problem of what sort of world the people who make up a nation really want. "If the problem of the control of money is to be solved," he writes, "and we are to create an order in which man may successfully live with money, the basis of the attack must be intellectual and spiritual." And he adds, what so few heterodox money theorists have the wisdom to admit, that no good will be done "by crucifying the banking interests, who are, as a body, no worse and no better than society as a whole, and who indeed but reflect in their practices the accepted ethic and norm". In other words, if what the American people want is the best possible gambler's chance to grow rich (or poor) overnight, then a form of credit-money is exactly what they should have. But if they turn their hearts and minds toward the more stable society that would come with the restoration of real property, they will need a different money system. Mr. Groseclose makes it clear that the usual objections to genuine intrinsic money are not conclusive. I wish he would consider the further question of just how to adapt an intrinsic money system to a nation of small property-owners.

The Soldier Who Walked with God

FRANK L. OWSLEY

AT LAST a labour of nearly two decades is completed, and the garnered fruit lies before us. In 1915 Douglas Southall Freeman accepted an invitation from Scribner's to write a definitive biography of Lee, and today the work is finished – two volumes lie before us* and the other two are in press. Mr. Freeman was already a technically trained historian and a good writer, but, in order to understand and present Lee, it was obviously necessary for him to master the theory of military science, and acquire the vocabulary of that science. One can feel in the background of this great biography of Lee, the man and soldier, the author's careful perusal of the memoirs and writings and biographies of the world's great generals, long days of study in reconnaissance, tactics, and strategy, the mastering of the Mexican War and the military history of the Confederacy as a whole, and finally the study of the economic, social, and political conditions behind the lines, all as preliminary to the study of Lee. Finally, one sees in the finished product personal material concerning Lee never before used or, perhaps, known to exist. The first two volumes seem to me to be the almost perfect biography of a public character: the intimate, personal life is well balanced and interwoven with the professional career of Lee.

* R. E. LEE *by Douglas Southall Freeman* (SCRIBNER'S. 2 vols. 1268 pp. $3.75 per volume)

There is only one criticism which I am able to offer as a student of history: unless the author corrects this in his next two volumes, it will have to be said that he imposed too great a task upon himself in attempting to master the internal history of the Confederacy from its sources in addition to his researches on Lee and his study of military history and science. Many students have been at work for decades searching the world for material with which to reconstruct and interpret Confederate non-military history, whose work might be useful to Mr. Freeman. Mr. Freeman himself says in substance that the conditions behind the lines have to be considered always in their relation to the military situation; but he has not done so adequately in his first two volumes. To the extent that he has failed to correlate conditions behind the lines with the conditions in Lee's army or the other armies of the Confederacy, he has failed to show Lee in his proper light. I have a strong feeling, however, that the next two volumes will correct this single – perhaps apparent – weakness.

II

The ancestry and environment of Lee are not treated in the genealogical style of Abraham begat Isaac, Isaac begat Jacob, and Jacob begat Joseph and his brethren. Carefully and artfully, the author brings in the Carters, the Lees, the Grymes, and the Blands. Especially do the religious and level-headed Carters, and the Lees, endowed with gifts of statesmanship and military genius, receive attention. Very early Robert Lee felt that a cloud of ancestral witnesses surrounded him and weighed his every act. He could never forget that he was the son of Light Horse Harry, the brilliant revolutionary soldier and intimate friend of Washington; he admired Washington above all men, and when he married Martha Washington's great-granddaughter and moved to Arlington to live, his admiration grew akin to worship. With great traditions and great inheritance, Lee felt that he must preserve without stain the family altar and household gods. Doubtless he inherited his great military genius and his courage, but his traditions sustained him and preserved his spirit unbroken when other men of fine qualities but no such traditions went down in the ordeal of civil war and reconstruction. Robert E. Lee, as far as I know, is the most convincing evidence in support of an agrarian aristocracy. No other environment or ancestry could have produced such a man.

III

When one weighs the question whether Lee, who graduated second in his class at West Point, should have chosen the Engineers or become an officer of the line, it is difficult to give an answer. As an engineer, Lee learned the science of fortification, which he was to use more than any general until 1914; he learned the best placement of artillery; and, in Mexico as a member of Scott's staff (his appointment being due to his brilliant record as an engineer) he learned to see the army as a whole, had some great lessons in strategy as a result; learned the importance of accurate reconnaissance, and became, in fact, Scott's chief reconnaissance officer. To offset the practical experience in fortifications, reconnaissance, and strategy is the startling fact that Lee had no experience in commanding troops – except two years in Texas as Lieutenant-

Colonel of the Second Cavalry – between the time of his graduation at West Point and the Seven Days battle in May and June 1862. That is, Robert E. Lee had had virtually no experience in handling even small bodies of troops until he was fifty-five years of age, when in accordance with human experience he should have been set in his ways, and, according to canine experience, too old to learn new tricks. Yet the War of Secession taught him new tricks every hour. Freeman's careful, detailed narrative shows a prematurely grey-bearded patriarchal leader growing more brilliant, more cunning, more daring, and more dangerous until the very ground fell out from under his boots in the winter of 1864-65. Nevertheless, Lee's lack of experience in commanding and drilling troops must be taken into serious consideration by any military critic of his generalship in the War between the States. Up to the battle of Fair Oaks when he fell heir to Johnston's army, he had been engaged in fortifying the Atlantic seaports and coast of the Confederacy or in acting as Davis's military adviser. Perhaps this will help explain in part how Lee was unable to co-ordinate his divisions and brigades and time their attacks in the Peninsular Campaign. He did not know how fast troops could march or how to calculate all the delays which mischance or natural obstacles might cause. It might help explain his deference to combat-commanders like Jackson, Longstreet, and the two Hills.

Lee has been often pictured as struggling for months to reach a decision whether to go with Virginia or stay with the Union. Freeman disposes of this briefly with documentary evidence which no one has seen fit to use or find, namely, the correspondence of Lee in the winter of 1860-61. During the winter of 1861 Lee expressed himself frankly as opposed to secession. "I can anticipate no greater calamity for the country than a dissolution of the Union," he wrote his son, Custis. The South had many just grievances against the North, thought Lee, but he believed at this time, at least, that they could be settled without breaking up the Union. "Still," he continued to Custis, "a union that can only be maintained by swords and bayonets, and in which strife and civil war are to take the place of brotherly love and kindness, has no charm for me. If the Union is dissolved and the Government disrupted, I shall return to my native state and share the miseries of my people, and save in self-defence will draw my sword on none." This was in substance what he wrote many people in the months before the secession of Virginia. Finally, when his state withdrew, he went with it. Freeman concludes that Lee was born or predestined to make the answer which he made to Scott in April, 1861, when Scott offered him the command of the Union Armies: that if he must make the choice between his own people and those who were not, he must go with his. He could not make war upon Virginia. Lee was also presented with another decision before Virginia seceded: he could not fight against the South. That is something which has been overlooked. The oversight of the decision that Lee could not fight against the South has been the basis of the belief rather widespread that Lee as a general never looked beyond Virginia. Once the choice between North and South became a necessity, in sadness but without wavering Lee did the simple, straightforward thing which was characteristic of him. It was a simple problem to a serene and simple soul. There were three loyalties involved: Virginia, the South, the North (not the Union because it no longer existed according to Lee's belief). There could be no hesitancy for Lee. Loyalties being relative and of the emotions, he chose the stronger loyalties: allegiance to Virginia and the South, and his action was the epitome of that of most of the Southern people.

Lee, in his humility, seemed to have actually believed that he would not be called upon by his state, but that he would be allowed to remain in private life or carry a musket and fight in the ranks! Incredible but true! Lee found it almost impossible to believe himself great. Even at the height of his glory, one suspects that Lee still thought of himself only as Captain Lee.

But he was soon called upon to become commander of Virginia troops and became Major-General at one stroke. This is one phase of Lee's life which Freeman brings out for the first time. It is an amazing phase. Within a few weeks Lee had forty thousand troops in the field, armed and drilling though not under his personal supervision. He fortified the York and James rivers so that Federal steamers did not attempt to invade the state. It illustrates Lee's great ability as an organizer and disciplinarian – many critics to the contrary notwithstanding. It made the victory of First Manassas possible. When Virginia joined the Confederacy, Lee was given the rank of Brigadier-General in the Confederate armies, while the forty thousand state troops were made part of the Southern army. Not only so, but Lee was put in charge of all military operations in that area. Yet he was not given any definite command. The result was that the Confederate forces were commanded by Beauregard at Manassas; Joe Johnston in the Valley; Loring, Floyd, and Wise in Western Virginia. Lee's position as commander of the armies in Virginia was extremely embarrassing. It carried no power; any of the generals could ignore his orders. He was in the same position in which Joseph E. Johnston found himself in 1862-63 when made commander of the armies of the West. Davis was unconsciously responsible for the situation. He took his position as commander-in-chief of the armies literally. And who can gainsay the fact that he was in many ways the most experienced officer in the Confederacy. He had been a combat-commander of troops in the Mexican War and had fought brilliantly. Under the Pierce administration he had proved himself one of the three ablest Secretaries of War the United States has had. The result of Davis's active participation in directing troop movements in Virginia was that Lee became a mere military adviser to Davis and the War Department, and occupied the position that Halleck was soon to occupy under Lincoln: a general held responsible by the public for the conduct of the war, but having no power to enforce his authority. The result of this was the abortive West Virginia campaign which placed Lee under a cloud.

Under stinging public abuse he was sent to fortify the coast of the Carolinas and Georgia. His work here was met by all kinds of insubordination because he had no real power other than his own ceaseless and calm persistence. At length, however, Lee the engineer and diplomat triumphed greatly. The defenses were so well prepared that they held out against bombardment and siege until most of them were finally taken in the winter of 1865 by land in Sherman's march.

When this work was done Davis called Lee back to Richmond as chief military adviser. By this time Joseph E. Johnston had assumed command over all the troops in the Virginia area, and was preparing to fight it out with McClellan. Lee under Davis imposed a considerable part of the general strategy of this campaign upon the self-willed and secretive Johnston, whose personal dislike for Davis explained much of his attitude. Finally, on May 31st, 1862, Johnston, who passively defied Davis and Lee, fell in the battle of Fair Oaks, seriously wounded. Lee, whom Davis admired and loved more than any other officer of the Confederacy, but whom he had almost ruined by giving him responsibility without power, was now put in active command of the army which Lee dubbed "the Army of Northern Virginia". I have already called attention to the fact that Lee had had only a few months' experience in commanding troops before 1862. Now on May 31st he took command of an army of seventy or eighty thousand in the midst of a desperate battle. The effect was electric. One Northern correspondent said that for the North, "the shell . . . which wounded . . . General Johnston, although it confused the Rebels, was the saddest shot fired during the war. It changed the entire Rebel tactics. It took away incompetence, indecision, and dissatisfaction and gave skillful generalship, excellent plans, and good discipline."

Lee's great powers of organization and administration made an army out of men who were inadequate only in numbers, and out of material incredibly worn, antiquated, and insufficient. The Confederate artillery was, to a large extent, still the old light smooth-bore, and was ineffective against the heavier rifled artillery of the Federal Army. The Confederate infantry was still armed principally with the old smooth-bore cap-and-ball musket as against the high-powered rifles of the Federals. Finally, the only people who knew anything of the terrain, roads, swamps, and streams of the Peninsula were the Federal generals, McClellan and his staff. This is explicable on three grounds: the United States War Department had all the topographical maps in its possession; Joseph E. Johnston, a topographical engineer who could have easily prepared maps of this region, had from the beginning determined to fight a defensive battle at Richmond, where he had concentrated most of his troops; that is, he did not intend to manoeuvre, but to fight from behind breastworks and trenches which Lee as Chief of Staff had already partly constructed. He would need no map of the Peninsula. He had no intention, apparently, of attempting to pursue McClellan in case the latter were worsted in the struggle. Finally, the maps which the Confederate War Department had had improvised were completely inaccurate – roads, streams, hills, fords all lay in the wrong place when Lee and, especially, Stonewall Jackson attempted to dispose their troops according to these maps.

These were the tools with which Lee had to work. Later Confederate artillery was rifled and heavy, though not as plentiful as the Federal equipment; modern, up-to-date Enfield rifles from England and from the hands of the enemy replaced the old smooth-bore musket; and shining bayonets were to gleam from the barrel of each rifle. It was obvious to Lee when he assumed command that with such tools only strategy could win a battle or campaign and strategy involved manoeuvre.

Without retelling the tragic story of the bloody Seven Days Battle, the strategy can be summed up briefly: within the department of Virginia, there were at this time about 85,000 or perhaps 90,000 Confederate troops disposed as follows: about 65,000 near Richmond directly under Lee's command; about 15,000 in the Shenandoah under Stonewall Jackson; and a few thousand disposed in a semicircle from the Shenandoah to Fredericksburg. In the same area but on the outside of the curve were about 200,000 Federal troops converging upon Richmond: 105,000 under McClellan were only five miles from Richmond. Lee's problem was to keep the enemy dispersed while concentrating his whole force upon his weakest point, overwhelming and confusing him. The first step – already partly guided by Lee before he succeeded Johnston – in the execution of the problem was the incredible Valley Campaign under Stonewall Jackson which defeated the armies of Milroy, Fremont, Banks, and Shields; paralyzed the army of McDowell just ordered to join McClellan at Richmond; and terrified Washington. In short around 100,000 Federal soldiers were either defeated or rendered inactive by the inscrutable Stonewall with a small army of 16,000 to 20,000. McClellan, who had depended upon the army of McDowell, numbering about 40,000, to reinforce him, and who had thrown his right wing of about 30,000 across the Chickahominy to make contact with McDowell, was now greatly shaken by the sudden turn of events. In the meanwhile Lee began the execution of his next step: to fall with the major portion of his army upon this weak right wing north of the Chickahominy and roll it up.

In order to do this he had almost to uncover Richmond. However, the main feature of the assault on the Federal right was to consist of a surprise attack by Jackson from the right rear. The story of how Jackson got there a day or more late is well known, as is also the story of how he rendered very little service in the whole campaign of the next seven days. Its explanation has never been totally satisfactory. Freeman carries no brief for Jackson, but suggests solutions of the mystery. Stonewall's troops had completed one of the most daring and brilliant campaigns since the days of Napoleon's Italian campaigns. His men were utterly exhausted from the endless and fast marches and fighting; and then without rest they had been forced to march a good part of the distance from the Valley to Richmond on foot and go into battle. As for Jackson, he had been in the saddle without rest or sleep for endless days. He seemed dazed and in a trance during the entire campaign. Finally, the accurate and exacting Jackson who calculated every foot of his manoeuvres, whose timing and placing of troops had mathematical precision, was handed a bundle of maps which bore the same resemblance to the Peninsula as the mediaeval maps did to the earth.

But this second step was not a failure, despite Jackson's tardiness. Although it did not disorganize the fine army of McClellan as expected, nevertheless it did confuse them, and struck something akin to terror into the heart of the commanding general which caused him to begin a hasty retreat. Again and again

Lee practically had the Federal army in the bag, but again and again Lee's divisions failed to synchronize, and Jackson's least of all. McClellan was finally able to withdraw his army under the protection of the Federal gun-boats where he was safe from Lee's manoeuvres. Without discrediting in any way the fine generalship of McClellan on this retreat, there hardly remains a doubt that had the parts of Lee's army worked as he planned, he would have captured the Federal army. This failure of Lee's subordinates to bring up their men where and when ordered has been attributed to Lee's lack of tactical ability and his inability to control subordinate commanders. However, when Lee's almost complete lack of experience in commanding even a small body of troops and his lack of accurate maps – for which he was not responsible – are considered, one wonders that his tactics were successful at all. As it was he had practically lost the battles by tactical weaknesses but had won the campaign by strategy.

As to Lee's inability to control his subordinates Freeman has much to say, which is in no way special pleading. He shows Lee time and again to have been excessively amiable or patient with unwilling or stubborn subordinates. Yet it was really Longstreet alone who persistently refused Lee unquestioning obedience. Freeman shows that Lee after one year of fighting had overcome this excessive consideration for subordinates; that, in fact, while always tactful, he was indomitable in his purpose. Nothing could shake him, and if he found a subordinate inefficient and inclined to disregard orders, Lee gently and tactfully sent this officer on some safe and unimportant front in another part of the Confederacy where he could do no harm. Only Longstreet challenged Lee's supremacy, and Lee permitted this because, next to Jackson, he considered Longstreet the ablest general in his army, and for a while after the Seven Days he thought he was superior to Jackson. He spoke of Longstreet as his war-horse and loved him personally. Moreover, except at the battle of Gettysburg, Longstreet's conduct really never offered Lee any real cause for severe discipline. Anything short of arrest and some penalty would have done no good; yet had Lee disciplined the vain and sensitive Longstreet and disgraced him before his army, he would have resigned; and Lee did not believe that he could be replaced. The probability that the policy of coercive discipline among general officers would have been practically impossible in the Confederacy is not given careful consideration by some critics – especially the English.

Insurrectionary armies cannot be dealt with as armies of well-established governments – not even so far as the private soldier is concerned, unless the government is a dictatorship. Discipline has to be attained by winning the confidence, respect, and even the love of the army. Lee was able to do this and create an army well disciplined and with morale equal to Napoleon's veterans. One of the best tests of discipline is the invasion of the enemy's country. In both of Lee's invasions of the North little plundering occurred: in fact Lee had a hungry soldier shot for stealing a pig! Sherman contended that plundering of private property was forbidden in his famous march to the sea and into the Carolinas, but nearly all private property for fifty miles on each side of the army was burnt or stolen — and Sherman was not leading an insurrectionary army.

While McClellan was trying to decide what to do next, at Harrison's Landing, and while Lee was trying to find out what he had decided, a large Federal army began to concentrate near Manassas Junction where the first great battle of the war had taken place the year before. Jackson guessed that McClellan had had enough and Lee soon agreed and left only a small force to watch him. Lee began concentrating troops to the west of Richmond; but not too far away to meet McClellan should he come back up the Peninsula. Soon the pugnacious Jackson fell upon a portion of Pope's army operating along the line of the Orange and Alexander railway and threw it back upon its base. Meanwhile McClellan began to transfer his army of 100,000 or more to Fredericksburg on the Rappahannock on Pope's left wing. To allow the armies of Pope and McClellan to unite would bring together between 150,000 and 200,000 to oppose much less than half that number. It was the same problem which confronted Lee when he succeeded Johnston at Fair Oaks: Lee must defeat one army before the other arrived. Pope had made large boasts about seeing only the backs of his enemies. He had ordered the plundering of the occupied region, and the execution of the inhabitants on any suspicion that they had communicated with the enemy; he ordered civilians shot in retaliation for guerrilla activities in their neighbourhood. Lee's reactions were that General Pope "must be suppressed". He usually spoke of "our friend, the enemy", but now he showed anger in this campaign and remarked that no civilized people had ever conducted such a war as the Federals were then waging.

The race between McClellan and Lee to reach Pope began as soon as Lee was certain that McClellan was going to transfer his army from the James. Quickly Lee moved upon Pope in the triangle made by the Rapidan and Rappahannock Rivers and the Orange and Alexander railway. But Pope squeezed out of this hole before the Confederates could confront him. Next began a manoeuvring up the Rappahannock, Pope trying to delay, and Lee meaning to come to grips with him and destroy him before he was joined by McClellan. Suddenly the enemy disappeared, drawing back toward his base at Manassas. Then Lee evolved his strategy. First Stuart was to ride around Pope's army and find his exact position, next Jackson screened by the foothills of the Blue Ridge Mountains was to make a swift march by his left flank around Pope's right flank and to his rear, cut off his communication, destroy his supply depot. Longstreet's corps was to remain in front of the enemy's position until Jackson had had time to get within striking distance of the enemy's rear, then Longstreet was to follow swiftly and join him in battle upon the Federal rear and right wing. Thus again Lee divided his force in the face of the enemy, but it worked almost perfectly, and Pope was surprised and overwhelmed and fell back within the Washington fortifications.

Soon Lee made his famous march into Maryland, and once again divided his army into several parts, the primary purpose being to clear the Shenandoah Valley, capture Harper's Ferry, and thereby secure his line of communication. The order dispersing the troops fell into the hands of McClellan and that usually cautious general began to show activities which astounded Lee. Lee found it necessary to fight a heavy rear-guard action at South Mountain in order to hold McClellan back while concentrating his army at Sharpsburg. While this was happening Jackson was mopping up the Valley, taking Harper's Ferry with 13,000 new rifles, 11,000 men, and 73 much needed pieces of artillery and other stores. Before more than 25,000 could be concentrated at Sharpsburg the battle began. The battle was in appearance a slugging match at close quarters with the Federal heavy guns far superior to the Confederates. But the Federals made the mistake of attacking successively the three sectors of the Confederate forces rather than the whole front simultaneously with their great numbers and powerful artillery. As it was, by use of the inside lines, Lee was able to thin out the parts of the line not under heavy fire and rush fresh troops to the point under greatest pressure. When the Federals finally attacked the right sector, the last of Lee's detached divisions arrived on the field – the division of A. P. Hill. Hill's 3000 men charged the attacking lines of the enemy and pushed them across Antietam Creek. That was the end of the battle. The next day Lee waited in vain for an attack, and then decided to deliver one himself if feasible. He would try a turning movement, but Jackson had already, in the company of Stephen D. Lee, famous artillerist, found the enemy's guns so heavily massed that any such move would be suicide. McClellan, while he waited for reinforcements, sat there holding Lee in an iron grip so that manoeuvring was impossible. Lee slipped quietly across the river and the Maryland campaign came to an end.

Lee's purpose in invading Maryland had been sound: to clear Virginia of Federal troops and find fresh pastures and food for horses and men, and to give Maryland an opportunity to join the Confederacy. Finally a victory on Northern soil would have a great moral effect; and, while Lee did not know it, such a victory would have brought English and French recognition, probably, to the Confederacy. The lost despatch which disclosed to McClellan the dispersed condition of Lee's army frustrated all possibilities of gaining these objectives.

We may pass over Fredericksburg in December 1862 as having little value in showing Lee as a general. It was essentially a massacre of the Federal troops led by the incompetent Burnside – a bravely but foolishly fought battle.

The winter of 1862-63, as Freeman points out, carried warning of impending disaster to the Confederacy: and here is where the English critics lose contact with reality. Fuller treats the army as if it were in a nice warm vacuum. The railways, not built for military purposes, were inadequate to transport food and clothing to the soldiers. The Commissary-General Northrop was not only incompetent, but spiteful; and, as far as I know, the only man in the world who hated Robert Lee. Instead of sending what food and blankets were available this strange person sent arguments and discourteous letters. Freeman does not bring this matter out in the first two volumes, but I must add that there was much distress among the poor up-country people who had so fully responded to the call for troops. Their women and children were starving, and, wherever the enemy invaded, were frequently abused and laboured under great fear. By this time, peace societies destined to grow larger and larger were forming among those who had reached the limit of physical and mental suffering. State Governors were frequently obstructing the operations of the Confederate government: any attempts to send some of the numerous state troops from Georgia or North Carolina or Texas were met by abrupt and discourteous refusal from the state Governors. The same attitude toward conscription existed among these State Rights officials. The blockade was becoming more stringent, and people, despite Lee's brilliant victories, were in deep distress. No doubt there was sufficient food for people and army, but the transportation system could not supply both adequately. Horses and mules were mere shadows in the army, and there were scarcely enough to plow the lands and cultivate the crops; without sufficient horses to pull wagon trains or artillery, men and horses must starve eventually; and in the meanwhile, the army which fights and moves on its belly must become paralyzed. From the winter of 1862-63 until the end of the war this situation grew worse, and more and more limited the movements of Lee's army and determined his strategy. It made it impossible to follow up any victory.

During the winter of 1862-63 we have the pathetic spectacle of Lee sending Longstreet with the greater portion of his corps to North Carolina partly to watch the enemy but chiefly to find food for horses and men, and other parts of his army in other directions to procure food and clothing. Lee divided his army again in the face of the enemy, now under the command of fighting Joe Hooker whom Lee rated highly. This time, however, he was making a flanking movement not against the enemy but against starvation. To add to the difficult situation Lee became seriously ill.

With his army reduced to almost half, barefooted, hungry, and many without blankets, Lee emerged from the long, cold winter of 1862-63 with the powerful enemy just across the river from Fredericksburg. Soon Hooker became active. Lee was alarmed at the scattered condition of his own army. He began concentrating smaller fragments but he left the matter to Longstreet's judgement whether it was better to attack the enemy on the coast, or continue his collection of foodstuffs, or come back and rejoin the depleted Army of Northern Virginia. While leaving this to Longstreet's judgement, Lee actually planned to meet the enemy without his sure but slow-moving general. This meant that Lee would have to fight the best equipped army in the world, numbering about 140,000 men, with an army of 62,000 tatterdemalions gaunt and hungry and harried by letters from home filled with tales of suffering and despair and sometimes of brutalities committed by the invaders. There was a difference, however, in the two armies which did not appear to the casual observer. Every man in the Confederate army felt that "Marse Robert" was his personal friend and the grand patriarch and father of his "boys". They instinctively felt that God was close to Marse Robert, for they had seen him during their years with him kneeling in prayers which God would not ignore; they had seen him reading the burial services over their fallen comrades and, after each victory, his proclamations and orders thanked God for the victory. These naïve and religious boys—many were barely eighteen – felt that Marse Robert who walked with God could never suffer defeat under any conditions. Then there was stern unsmiling Stonewall Jackson who was kind and who cared for his men: he prayed all night before battles, and breathed a constant prayer for the guidance and success of the army while the guns were smoking in battle. Stonewall Jackson and Marse Robert and God were with the army: they were invincible. Nor does it seem that Stonewall or Robert E. Lee regarded it in any other aspect. Lee a Low Churchman and Jackson a Presbyterian were equally confident of the presence of God in their armies and humbly believed that He would lead them to victory. But these two fatalists left nothing to chance: they and their troops, like the Mohammedan Arabs of the Middle Ages, took to heart the proverb that God helps those who help themselves.

Hooker's army, though well trained and equipped, had no such confidence in their commander, though he was an excellent soldier. They frankly admired Lee, many of them, and, unfortunately for their success, believed that he and Jackson could not be defeated. Then there was another element which cannot be overlooked, but which is not mentioned by Freeman at this point: the Army of the Potomac was coming to be made up more and more of foreign mercenaries brought into America in the guise of labourers secretly pledged to enter the army for the large bounties offered. Before the war ended nearly 500,000 such troops were employed, not to mention 250,000 Negroes. This was in addition to those foreigners who had emigrated to America during the fifties. Whole brigades could not speak English, and pillaging and spoils were their chief concern. Such an army could hardly have the morale of an army composed of a homogeneous race, which had an almost religious reverence for their commander and a belief that a very real and personal God was in their camps.

In April and May 1863 Hooker's magnificently equipped army was strung out for many miles along the Rappahannock. It looked as if he might cross at Fredericksburg on the Confederate right flank or as if he might cross miles up the river. He finally did both, but at the wrong time. Hooker's main army crossed the Rappahannock and was exactly in the position occupied by Pope the year before when Lee had attempted to catch him in the triangle formed by the confluence of the Rapidan and Rappahannock, and the Orange and Alexander railway. Lee, however, now felt that his men were too badly shod, and his horses and mules too weak for large-scale manoeuvring, so he allowed Hooker to get out of the triangle by crossing the Rapidan just above Chancellorsville. This put the bulk of the Federal army on the side of the river with Lee, while the remainder of the Federal army under General Sedgwick was showing signs of crossing at Fredericksburg, attacking Lee from the rear, getting between him and Richmond and cutting his line of communication. This was good strategy, but Lee's and Stonewall's was better. They did not wait for the Federals to attack. After feeling out the enemy they knew that a frontal attack would be suicide. Then the strategy which Lee had so often employed in one way or another was agreed upon: a movement by the left flank so deep as to be completely concealed from the enemy; followed by an attack from the rear of his exposed right flank. Jackson's contribution to the strategy was one of emphasis rather than principle. He and Lee were perfectly agreed that surprise flanking movements were the only chance of defeating an enemy superior in numbers and artillery. In the words of Freeman:

> Lee had left the execution of the movement to Jackson and had not prescribed a definite route or designed how many troops were to follow. He now turned to "Stonewall" who was still studying the map. "General Jackson", said he, "what do you propose to do?"
>
> "Go around here," Jackson said, and traced the route that Hotchkiss had marked.
>
> "What do you propose to make this movement with?"
>
> "With my whole corps," Jackson answered.
>
> That was Jackson's own conception, his major contribution to the plan. He would not attempt a simple turning movement that would merely confuse the enemy and give an opening for a general assault. In moving to the enemy's rear, as Lee had planned, he would march with all his 28,000 men and would attack in such force as to crumple the enemy and throw the whole right wing back against the fords. It was a proposal Lee had not expected, and it floored him. "What will you leave me?" he said in some surprise.
>
> "The divisions of Andrews and McLaws," Jackson answered unabashed.

This meant perhaps a mere screen of not over 10,000 and possibly not more than 6,000 men to oppose the Federal front of not less than 50,000. But Lee's fighting blood was stirred to its depths by such colossal boldness. If never before, surely now he must have recognized in Jackson the supreme strategist and military executive. Jackson rode away slightly flushed:

He disappeared like a Norse God into the Forest. As Lee looked, it must have been with confidence, with personal affection and with admiration. "Such an executive officer," he said not many days thereafter, "the sun never shone on."

Crossing from the right flank behind the left flank into the wilderness Jackson swiftly executed his deep circuit around the enemy's right flank and into the rear. Falling upon the Federal General Howard, while the men were cooking supper, Jackson rolled up the division and threw it back upon Hooker's centre where great confusion was created. Had Jackson not been shot down, mortally wounded, it seems hardly possible that Hooker could have escaped from the battlefield. The next day Stuart, in command of Jackson's corps, continued to drive back Hooker's line; and at the same time the division of McLaws and Andrews, reinforced by some of the Confederate forces near Fredericksburg, commenced a frontal attack, sliding always to the left until contact was finally made with Jackson's second corps. Hooker was about to be driven in the river, when Sedgwick crossed below and occupied the fortifications at Fredericksburg and threatened Lee's army from the rear. But such a movement was too late: it was quickly met by sending Early back to support Andrews and McLaws who had been detached from Lee's right to hold off Sedgwick while Hooker was being driven back. Like the other commanders, McClellan and Pope, Hooker had found Lee invincible with half his army grazing horses and gathering supplies in North Carolina.

The wounding of Stonewall Jackson saddened Lee deeply. When he was reported ill with pneumonia and beyond hope Lee would not give him up. There was one thing he could do for Jackson after all human aid failed, that was to pray for him.

On Saturday night as the doctors shook their heads and expressed their fear that the outlook was hopeless Lee went down spiritually to the brook of Jacob and like Jacob, wrestled with the angel. Never in his life had he prayed with so much agony of spirit. While the army slept and Jackson in his stupor fought his battles over, Lee on his knees implored Heaven to grant to his country the mercy of the deliverance of Jackson from death.

But the doctors had given Jackson up. He was in a coma. "A. P. Hill," he was saying, "prepare for action"; and again: "I must find out whether there is high ground between Chancellorsville and the river . . . push up the columns, hasten the columns." But Lee could not believe that God would permit Stonewall to leave him. "Surely, General Jackson must recover", he said in a shaken voice to the chaplain. "God will not take him from us now that we need him so much. Surely he will be spared to us, in answer to the many prayers which are offered for him." When the chaplain who had brought the news of Jackson's impending death was ready to return to the dying man's side, Lee said, "When you return, I trust you will find him better. When a suitable occasion offers, give him my love, and tell him that I wrestled in prayer for him last night, as I never prayed, I believe, for myself." And he had to turn away abruptly to hide his emotions. As Lee sat waiting, a chain of memories of his great lieutenant must have been awakened in his mind, and the great achievements of the dauntless Stonewall passed in review. If Jackson could recover, they would assume the offensive and Harper's Ferry would not stop them again. The fear of Jackson's name would cause the enemy to evacuate it, they could march into Maryland and Pennsylvania and carry the war into the enemy's territory.

There was a stir outside the tent, a moment of hesitation, then some one brought in a bit of folded paper. It contained the dreadful news. In the little cottage at Guiney's Station Jackson had aroused from his restless sleep and had struggled to speak. His mind had been wandering far — who knows how far — but with an effort, in his even low voice, he had said: "Let us pass over the river, and rest under the shade of the trees." And then, as so often on marches into the unknown, he had led the way.

Thus ends the second volume at the mighty climax of Chancellorsville where Stonewall lost his life and Lee his right arm. Had Jackson lived, even with the Confederacy falling into ruins in his rear it seems impossible for Lee to have lost the battle of Gettysburg. Later, when a Presbyterian preacher referred to the overthrow of the South, he said, in substance: "When O God, in thy inscrutable way, Thou didst will that the Confederacy must be overthrown, it was first necessary to remove thy servant Stonewall Jackson." For the moment, with the tragic death of Stonewall who had, according to the generous Lee, made the victory of Chancellorsville possible, "Marse Robert" almost retires from the stage. It is a skilful, artistic ending and it leaves one impatient to open the next volume which is not yet in print.

Art and a Changing Civilization

A New Study by Eric Gill

GRAHAM CAREY

ONLY by an understanding of the past can we hope to be intelligent about the present; and only by an understanding of the present can we hope to be intelligent about the future. And unless we at least try to be intelligent about the future, we cannot hope that the world of the future will be a very good place in which our children and our children's children are to live. Let us, then, try to be intelligent about the past.

Of the four roughly equal periods into which our history during the Christian era falls, we are most concerned with the two most recent – the Middle Ages – *c.* 1000 to *c.* 1500 – and the "Modern" period ushered in by the Reformation and the Renaissance – *c.* 1500 to the present. Mr. Gill's book* deals with the great changes which were taking place in the minds of European men during the first part of the sixteenth century, the results of those changes during the whole of the "Modern" period (particularly the growth of the industrial system, a finance founded upon usury, and the ever-increasing menace of huge commercial wars), and asks us to think realistically about these things and realistically about the future.

---

* ART AND A CHANGING CIVILIZATION *by Eric Gill* (JOHN LANE, The Twentieth Century Library. 158 pp. 2/6).

"Rome is burning — at least the gunpowder is in the cellars — this is no time for dope."

Were it not for the ambiguity which affects the word "modern", we might say that Mr. Eric Gill is one of the great modern prophets. But it is our privilege to live in the transition period between two great eras of history, and the word "modern" is used to describe both the period that we are leaving and that into which we are rather rapidly emerging. It is used to describe forces that are not only diametrically opposed to one another, but at war with one another. On the one hand the word is used to describe the character of the whole post-mediaeval period, that period ushered in by the Reformation and the Renaissance, down to its culmination in the Victorian Security and the Great War; while on the other hand it is used to describe the forces of reaction, which have begun to be increasingly noticeable since the Great War. Mr. Gill is only "modern" in the latter sense. He finds himself at the end of an era ushered in by the Reformation and the Renaissance. He finds that neither the reform nor the rebirth have fulfilled their election pledges; that they were never able to do so, having been in reality misnamed; and that both are today discredited among those who will be remembered tomorrow. He is "modern" in the sense that he is part of a reaction against the mistakes of the immediate historic past, which reaction is rapidly gathering force in our day.

Mr. A. J. Penty has somewhere written that the basic achievement of the Renaissance was the dethronement of absolute and the establishment of relative values — that it was the sixteenth century that authorized our civilization to put second things first. These are not Mr. Penty's words, but they express his intention, and, as he has done so often before, so here he takes us straight to the buried root of things. Mr. Gill's book is a very forceful and compelling development of this theme. He notices many examples of the way men's thought shifted from a regard for absolute values to a regard for relative values – that is a shift from a religious attitude toward life to a secular attitude – and examines in particular the results of this change of attitude upon the business of making things by men, the business of production, of art. This broad use of the word *art* is characteristic of Mr. Gill. It is characteristic that he should go straight for the primary meanings of words, and refuse to be seduced into a contemporary usage which is a direct result of the errors he is exposing. "Art is the business of making in general. All things made are works of art – that is the theme of this book." This is of course not only the pre-Renaissance European idea of art, but it is that of practically all times and places. Only in our own recent history, and for a short historical moment during the decline of the classical culture, has art ever been regarded in any other way. Our "modern" idea of art as of a very special kind of production produced by a very special kind of a person, is one of the results of the relativist attitude toward life characteristic of our times.

Let us run over some of the examples that Mr. Gill cites of the shift from the mediaeval religious to the Renaissance secular view of life, printing them in each case as couplets, first the mediaeval idea and then the Renaissance idea opposing it. We state many baldly and brutally, which were and are always carefully camouflaged, but the ideas are nevertheless implicit in men's speech and actions, though they are seldom stated clearly. Many others, of course, the modern world feels no difficulty in stating with perfect candour.

* * * * *

Truth is ultimately discoverable by the human mind.

Truth is not discoverable by the human mind. Only relative truths are therefore worth pursuit.

* * * * *

Reality or Essence is more worth pursuit than appearance.

Reality or Essence is not discoverable and therefore its pursuit is vain.

* * * * *

Man is not an End in himself, but a means to an End.

Man is not responsible to anything but himself.

* * * * *

Man is a responsible being. Government should preserve and encourage that responsibility to the utmost.

The responsibility of common people is nonexistent. The workman is therefore a tool in the hand of his master.

* * * * *

Law is to enable good men to live among bad men.

Law is to enable rich men to live among poor men.

* * * * *

Man is essentially a working or producing creature. His happiness lies in perfecting work – in Art.

*Man is essentially an enjoying creature and work is a curse. His happiness therefore lies in the avoidance of all but the most pleasurable work.**

* * * * *

Money exists for the purpose of exchanging things.

Things are brought into existence for the sake of making money.

* * * * *

Art is the business of well-making what needs making.

Art is the business of pleasing the rich by making for them what they naturally like best, portraits of themselves and pictures of their possessions.

* * * * *

Production should be controlled for use.

Production should be controlled for profit.

* * * * *

Good art is the making of perfect things, which are therefore beautiful, and are therefore capable of arousing pleasurable emotions.

Good art is the making of things capable of arousing pleasurable emotions.

---

* This avoidance of ordinary work means in practice avoidance of it by the avaricious, the slothful, and the undisciplined, and the imposition of it, in a dehumanized form from which all possible enjoyment has been removed, upon the weak, the stupid, and the humble.

* * * * *

The beautiful thing is that which when seen pleases.
The beautiful thing is that which conforms to a classical standard only available to the educated.

* * * * *

Art is primarily making, and its basis is imagination.
Art is primarily imitation, and its basis is vision.

* * * * *

All arts are good in themselves.
The only arts that are good in themselves are painting, sculpture, poetry, and music, which minister to the enjoyment of the rich and those who have leisure.

* * * * *

The workman works for the good of the work.
The workman works for the profit of his master.

* * * * *

Fame for good quality and loveliness of produce is the mark of national greatness.
Quantity of produce, and therefore profit, is the mark of national greatness.

* * * * *

The idea of work goes with the idea of responsibility.
Hands are not men, do not think, have no responsibility.

* * * * *

Art is based on utility.
Art is based on luxury.

* * * * *

In architecture, appearance should be sacrificed to function.
In architecture, function should be sacrificed to appearance.

* * * * *

The interior of a building is more important than the exterior. It is a roofed space. Its inside is what it is for.
The exterior of a building is more important than the interior. The exterior is concerned with appearance, which is more important than essence.

* * * * *

Temples and churches are the chief objects of architectural magnificence.
Palaces and banks are the chief objects of architectural magnificence.

* * * * *

Such a list of contradictions is one way of saying why the "modern" world came into existence, and how it came into existence. Let us try to explain this same phenomenon by a more philosophical method.

If the prime error of the Renaissance was a turning away from the real, the essential, the primary, we can best understand what happened and best help to correct the consequent evil situation by an eager pursuit of the real, the essential, and the primary, and a courageous turning aside from all that is relative and secondary. To do this we must have intelligence as well as will. Granted the good will, by what intelligent method are we to lay hold intellectually of the essence of objects of art, and avoid the omnipresent allurements of the relative? Mr. Gill indicates the answer to this question in a note on his second page:

> The existence of anything has four *causes*:
>
> 1. The defined purpose of the thing to be made (*Final Cause*).
> 2. The material of which the thing is made—for obviously different materials cause different results (*Material Cause*).
> 3. The energy, force, will of the workman—for obviously, without these, purpose and material are insufficient (*Efficient Cause*).
> 4. The imagination of the workman—for unless the workman sees the form of the thing to be made in his mind before he makes it, purpose, material, and will can produce nothing (*Formal Cause*).

If we understand the causes of a thing, we shall understand its essence, the thing as it really is apart from what we or its maker think about it. If we study merely our reactions to an object, be it painting or locomotive, all we shall learn will be a relative truth regarding our relation to it. If we study merely the intention of the maker, all we shall learn will be another relative truth, regarding his relation to it. But if we study the purpose of the thing, the *good*, desire which has caused the thing to appear in the world of objects, we already know something about it absolutely. We know its Final Cause. If we study the matter from which it has been shaped, and the forces which caused that shaping, we know still more about it absolutely. We know its Material and Efficient Causes. And if we can study the creative concept which the artist had in his mind, the image which he copied in the material when he made the thing, then we know another absolute truth regarding it, we know its Formal Cause. And the combination of these four causes is the thing itself. To the extent that we can understand them we can understand the essence or reality of a work of human making as distinct from its appearance.

The Material and Efficient Causes are concerned with technique and are thus called the technical causes. The Final and Formal Causes are concerned with concepts, the one in the mind of the user or consumer or patron, and the other in the mind of the maker or producer or artist. The Final Cause, the concept of a good desired, the concept in the mind of the consumer or patron, *that* is a real thing, and the point of view of the consumer desiring a known and defined true good is a normal cause for the production of the works of man. The Formal Cause, the concept of the object to be made for the achievement of that good, conceived in the mind of the producer or artist, *that* is a real thing, and the point of view of the producer imagining this image is a normal cause for the production of the works of man. Indeed the production of works of art must be a co-operation between the patron and the artist, between the desirer of a good and the seer of a vision. All things made by man, from macadam roads to psychological novels, must be the result of such co-operation. Only, if the object is to be good, the Final and Formal Causes of it must be good in their kind, must harmonize with each other, with the Technical Causes, and the process must be a collaboration based on mutual trust and esteem, and not a fight:

> There is of course a reasonable give and take. The reasonable customer knows that there are things about the art of painting which he knows nothing about. In such matters the painter has his way. But the reasonable painter knows that, as he takes his customer's money, he is the servant of his customer, and must in justice supply what his customer asks for.

What, since the Renaissance, has happened to this normal way of making things? What has happened is this. A new figure – the trader, the man of business, the financier, has come between the two principals in the affair:

> Things had always been bought and sold, but now that was their first reason for existence. The buyer still wanted hair-brushes for his hair, boots for his feet, churches and town halls for meeting places; but that was no longer why they were made. They were now made simply as merchandise. . . . Industrialism is a process in which men who want and men who make never meet and all negotiation is between the managing directors of the factory and the commercial travellers whose business it is to find out from shopkeepers what will sell. This absence of intercourse between makers and users necessarily means that the thing made is no longer a thing made by one person for another. The personal business is now ruled out of the transaction. . . . And as the personal business is ruled out between makers and users, so it is between the maker and the work. Things are no

longer made as the user orders, nor, even, are they made as the workman chooses. A workman's choice can only be operative when he is a person actually working for persons and when he is a responsible workman working in control of all the relevant processes of his trade. In a factory neither of these conditions is present. You neither deal with the customer, the consumer, nor control the process. . . . The degradation of things was necessarily brought about by the degradation of the workman. . . . Now the problem of art in the twentieth century is: how to arrange or organize the state so that the making of things shall be controlled by those who make them, and those who use them, and removed from the control of those who merely sell them. The problem is . . . how to break the commercial spirit which now moves everyone, whether in big business or in small, whether in high places or in low, and how to break the power of international finance in time to avert a series of wars more disastrous than the last and thereafter the complete collapse of civilization in the West.

One of the effects of this control of the man of business over art, and of his kind of use of machinery in production, is that art which always had been merely the business of making things has split in two. On the one hand Final Causes are emphasized, but are combined with very defective Formal Causes. Useful things are made, but because machines are incapable of the imposition of Form upon Matter, their Final Causes are combined with very defective or unsuitable Formal Causes. We have the world of factory production of necessities. On the other hand Formal Causes are emphasized, but are combined with very defective Final Causes. Useless things are made, useless "because industrialism has relieved the artist of the necessity of making anything useful". We have the world of artistic production of luxuries.

The clear distinction between these two kinds of artists, between those "who have been reduced to a subhuman condition of intellectual irresponsibility" and those who are not interested in Final Causes but merely in the forms seen inside their own heads, has been disguised until recently by the industrialists' belief that things with pre-industrial shapes could be adequately made by machinery. This, happily, is no longer the case, and it is now generally recognized that a well-made machine-made object must be designed especially for the machine to make, and not in imitation or reminiscence of the shapes of hand-made things. The shapes of things are entirely dependent upon their four causes, and if you radically change the Efficient Cause of a thing you necessarily change its very nature. It is no longer the same thing, and will have a shape of its own. If you try to impose upon it a shape not naturally its own, you will produce an imperfect and ugly object. The nineteenth and the earlier part of the twentieth century was filled with ugly objects which were ugly for this reason. From the buildings of the Gothic Revival to the bodies of the early automobiles, things were given the old shapes of things other than themselves, for reasons of sentiment, stupidity, or sloth, rather than the new shapes of the new things that they really were.

Mr. Gill is at pains to show that the difficulty is not fundamentally with the use of machinery, but with the abuse of it of which commercially-minded controllers of production have been guilty. He points out that both capitalism and industrialism (or the use of factories in production) preceded the invention and use of power-driven machinery, and that the pre-machine factories were so inhuman that the introduction into them of machinery was often hailed as a relief from heartbreaking and deadly toil, in spite of the obvious fact that it was of its very nature to displace labour and cause unemployment. "It is perfectly possible to make good things by machinery. . . . But to bring this about it is necessary that the machines shall be owned and controlled by the designers of the things to be made." For "commercial rule is that under which all things are means and none are ends".

The whole book may be best summed up as a great appeal to Reality, "la sainte réalité" as the poet Claudel has it. What is True? What is Bunk? It is imperative that the question should be faced and answered. The very existence of our civilization depends upon by whom it is answered, how it is answered, and whether it is answered in time. For four hundred years those who have controlled the destinies of the West have chiefly put their trust in Bunk. And the chaotic and miserable state of the industrialized countries today is the inevitable result of such a choice. Will the reaction in favour of Reality be strong enough to undo the evils of four hundred years, and will it be in time? "The twentieth century will be the stage upon which will be played out the drama, tragic or comic, of the struggle of naked man, as it were Laocoön, with the twin snakes of Usury and War." And the snakes will most surely destroy him, unless he is able to enlist "la sainte réalité" upon his side.

Corporations and Human Liberty: A Study in Exploitation

II. *Regaining the Rights of the Individual*

JOHN C. RAWE

IN order that we may balance and guide our legal reasoning in the pursuit of liberty and justice, what procedure must we follow in the solution of the problems we face? There are three main methods which will be considered here – methods which differ somewhat in their degree of adequacy and availability. For the sake of brevity we shall call these methods: (1) the CORRECT INTERPRETATION method – a method which has its educational and judicial difficulties; (2) the AMENDMENT method, which has its political and legislative difficulties; and (3) the INDUSTRIAL CODE CORPORATION method – an indirect method which is substantially the NEW DEAL method, a method which presents a special difficulty in the obscurity of its legal status. We shall readily admit the possibility of other methods, but none of them would really be along constitutional lines, nor would they be, for that very reason, American methods.

All three of the methods specifically enumerated above rest upon the common principle which may be stated baldly thus: the state, *i.e.*, either the Federal government or the individual states (and for the sake of effective uniform action preferably the Federal government) *must have the power* and in some cases where the public good demands it the Federal government or the individual states will have the duty to exercise the power of *regulation and control of all joint stock corporations in business*, and in the event that any such measures prove inadequate the Federal government or the individual states must have the power of complete abolition of any joint stock corporation engaged in any given business venture. All this power arises by implication from the primary relation of the Federal government or the individual states to the natural persons of the commonwealth — a relation established by the Constitution by way of antecedent right. This principle every American is bound to face squarely and grant approval. We accepted the principle when we signed and ratified the Constitution. It was never our intention in any of our constitutions, either national or state, to create a government which was to bow in submission to the dictatorial policy and unrestrained greed of any joint stock corporation. We intended to have a government then, and we intend to have a government now, that has the power to regulate and control any joint stock corporation that it creates — a regulation and control which is demanded for the general public good of the natural citizens who constitute the body politic.

II

The first method, the correct interpretation method, is an honest appraisal of the real import of the terms of the Constitution in the light of history and in the light of more recent economic disturbances which industrialized monopolies have engendered. It is essential, of course, that the great majority of our citizens and especially the great rank and file of able judges, reach a practical unanimity of agreement in this interpretation – an agreement which can be hoped for only after days and months and even years of a much deeper study of all our problems of social justice and rightly ordered social life from a truly Christian and constitutional point of view. But recent developments in the science of economics and the educational efforts along these lines, promoted and sponsored by President Roosevelt, have clarified many of the issues formerly involved in any correct interpretation of the Constitution.

With whose liberty and with what kind of liberty were the framers of the Constitution really concerned, and whose liberty and what kind of liberty is the utmost concern of ourselves, and our government now? These questions are simply answered. In the Constitution it has always been, is now, and will always be a question of the social and individual liberties of the people, the human beings, who constitute this nation. The Constitution says nothing, either explicitly or implicitly, about any particular liberty for "free" societies such as stock-manipulating joint stock corporations who claim every liberty and license for the concentration of property. For the sake of clearness on this point, I repeat that the Constitution was never concerned, is not now and never will be concerned about the liberty and license of joint stock corporations. Unfortunately the legal profession, unmindful of its first duty to plead for the recognition and preservation of human rights, has concerned itself entirely too long in strengthening the position of dominating joint stock corporations. Will lawyers and judges continue to abandon their championship of human rights and liberties or may we hope that once more true to the nobler ideals of their profession, they will plead the cases of the downtrodden and the weak against the unrestrained supremacy and selfish conduct of conspiring capitalistic machines of production and investment, mere artificial persons, whose true place in the body politic is that of subordination and generous service for the general good of all natural citizens?

The Constitution never did admit of the possibility of any enslavement of the natural person by the industrial dictatorship of some two hundred artificial persons. It committed to the government the sacred duty of guarding us against aggression or servitude that might come from without, and it likewise gave the government the commission to preserve us against any enslaving force from within. If the Constitution had anticipated any danger from the strength of joint stock corporations, the government would have been given, in express terms, the power to proceed against them. But the undermining influences of the private joint stock corporations on human liberties could not have been foreseen, until in comparatively recent times, because they constitute a radically new danger in the history of mankind which for the first time has become highly industrialized. Hence any constitutional power to proceed against monopolistic joint stock corporations is to be found only by implication among the powers granted to the government to proceed against internal enemies in general. Internal enemies to constitutional liberties constantly present themselves under new disguises. Let us not be deceived and led to think that because the internal enemy hides behind the innocent guise of a private joint stock corporation, that we are without constitutional power against him. If we are to safeguard what personal and constitutional liberties we have and restore the personal and constitutional liberties which we have lost, we must promptly arrive at a constitutional interpretation which maintains that the Federal government is well within the exercise of its constitutional prerogatives when there is question of the restriction and revocation of joint stock charters and the regulation and control of joint stock corporations, where there is need for the security of the greater common good of all natural citizens.

The old concepts of liberty and private ownership and private property, widely diffused among many owners, are concepts representing real objective truth. These concepts do not have to be distorted or revolutionized or "evolved" to fit the organization of some twentieth-century joint stock corporation that would gather up, in the name of constitutional law, all liberty and control and ownership of private property into its own bosom. Such organizations if they wish to exist at all must be compelled to adjust themselves to the meaning of liberty and control and ownership of private property as they are used in the Constitution in behalf of natural persons.

It has been proven that whites and blacks can enjoy equal basic liberties and live peaceably in the same community. Likewise we have been trying to prove that natural persons and artificial persons of the type of the joint stock corporation can enjoy the same liberties and together promote the general welfare. But when two hundred such artificial persons begin to control the public press, run the strongest lobbies, determine the prices of commodities arbitrarily, close down the factories, crash the stock markets, change the purchasing power of money so that debts become usurious, and in general block the free exchange and flow of money and credit, and acquire the ownership of eighty per cent of all productive property, then, what liberty is left for the one hundred and twenty million natural persons of this commonwealth? Even the stockholders of such corporations are the slaves of their own directors.

The courts at one time seemed to think that the liberty granted the Negro race was also the liberty that was to be bestowed upon the joint stock corporation in the business world, but that interpretation is losing its ground now and justly so. In those judicial decisions it was thought that the protection of property rights and constitutional liberties alleged in behalf of the joint stock corporation, really insured the property rights and constitutional liberties of the natural person. But no judge who sincerely faces the facts of American economic life will base any decisions upon any such principle now. Rather the opposite of this principle has proven itself to be the true principle; namely, the emphasis of property rights and inviolability of alleged constitutional rights for the joint stock corporation has made it impossible for the large majority of natural persons to enjoy any decent measure of liberty or ownership at all. And since it is now evident that a certain real kind of slavery is again extending itself, this time over all the members of the human family, save perhaps a money-mad few who hide their tyranny behind the joint stock corporation, American judges will, of course, be among the first to return to a sounder and wiser interpretation of the requirements of human liberty. They will then decide that in accordance with the general tenor of the Constitution we must at least control that internal power, the monopolizing joint stock corporation, which is making itself our master and robbing us of our meed of constitutional liberties, and the ownership and control and enjoyment of private property. Such a judicial interpretation as this does not give the terms of the Constitution a forced interpretation. On the other hand, it really does violence to the terms of the Constitution to extend them to a chartered artificial joint stock corporation.

The great statesmen who framed the Constitution would readily argue thus, for their own liberties were very dear to them, and it is the only logical interpretation that any genuine champion of the people's rights can use, and it is the only interpretation that the people in all justice to themselves can place upon their Constitution. Otherwise the Constitution fails us when we need it most; our government is paralyzed; and we, including the government, become the mere puppets of a crushing despotic incorporated oligarchy such as the world has never seen. But only much correct education and honest study of the social order, human liberties, and social equity and justice, will enable the great majority of the American people to think correctly in these matters and therefore to give to their Constitution its real, true, and genuine meaning.

III

The second method, the "amendment" method, would be a strictly legal and constitutional method, a method well within the power of the people of the United States to have recourse to. And it is perhaps the only method which makes us adequately secure and free in the enjoyment of human liberties in this industrialized twentieth century. This method calls for the passage of an amendment which would become a part of the Federal Constitution. Such an amendment could be passed in any one of the several ways provided for in the terms of the Constitution itself. The amendment would read substantially as follows:

AMENDMENT

No right, privilege, or immunity granted or secured to the individual citizen in this Constitution shall be construed either directly or indirectly to apply to any joint stock corporation engaged in commerce. No joint stock corporation engaged in commerce is a citizen according to the terms used in this Constitution, but such a joint stock corporation is only an artificial person subject to Federal and state regulation and control according to the terms of its special charter and special corporate statutes. And when the public good clearly demands it such joint stock corporations are to be regulated and controlled under the valid exercise of the police power, even though this regulation and control involves the suspension of any rights conferred in the joint stock corporation's charter or special corporate statutes.

Such an amendment would clarify the terms of the Constitution and enable the government to proceed with legal confidence in the execution of any measures that would prove to be necessary against intolerable capitalistic machines. But the special difficulty of this method is at once apparent. Will the American voter understand the necessity of such an amendment? And if he did understand to some extent, we must remember that the joint stock corporations will send a strong lobby to Washington, issue false propaganda to the effect that human liberty is at stake, and then defraud and buy the vote of the men and women who do not fully realize that already the commercial joint stock corporation has become their master in too many ways and that they are its slaves.

Senator Borah, a conscientious statesman and a profound student of American affairs, recently spoke as follows:

> What is liberty in this twentieth century? The power [the power, *i.e.*, the monopolistic joint stock corporation] to fix the price of the things I must have in order that I may live and not die, is my master, and the fact that I may enjoy free speech and read a free press does not assuage the cruelty of that fact or ameliorate my servitude in any degree whatever. The power [the power, *i.e.*, the monopolistic joint stock corporation] which closes the door of opportunity to me in the business world leaves me cold to all their panegyrics about liberty. . . . The monopoly which crushes my small business, as is now being done in thousands of cases, and sends my family to the bread line, takes away all my enthusiasm over the right of trial by jury. The power to exploit the weaker and the more unfortunate in the economic world brings more misery to men, women, and

children than the denial of the right to "peaceably assemble and pass resolutions". There is no liberty worthy of the name without economic freedom and social justice. . . . With at least eighty per cent of the human family, human rights have utterly vanished. With these liberty is dead.

And, note well, the Senator is speaking about the liberty of human beings. He is not speaking about the "liberty" of joint stock corporations or monopolies. Human beings have lost many of their liberties because of the "liberties" that joint stock corporations have had. The passage of such an amendment to the Constitution as has been indicated above would do more for the restoration of human liberty than the amendments which emancipated the Negro ever did. Such an emancipation amendment would once again definitely and adequately restore the human personal rights and liberties which have suffered so much from the commercial supremacy and domination of the forces of joint stock corporations. Have we anywhere in this broad land a dynamic statesman and loyal supporters who are courageous enough to break through money-backed lobbies and political trickery, to champion this new cause of liberty and promote a new constitutional amendment of economic emancipation?

IV

The third method, the indirect method of control by means of an *Industrial Code Corporation*, or its equivalent in each industry, is also a constitutional method. And this is substantially the New Deal method. Because of the noisy criticism launched in the public press by the salaried spokesmen for the very few who are deeply intrenched in the precious monopolies of their joint stock corporations, many of us may have begun to doubt the constitutional soundness of the New Dealers. However, the fact remains that the New Dealers have a strong constitutional background for their procedure.

To understand this third method clearly we must define the nature and indicate the position of what we shall call an Industrial Code Corporation. The Industrial Code Corporation is again a legal personality which the government creates, but here with a view to protect the natural rights of all those, whether capitalist or labourer, who are occupied in a definite industry. The government imposes upon this Industrial Code Corporation a very special function which would otherwise be the function of the government itself, and for the accomplishment of this function the government holds the Industrial Code Corporation responsible. Both the government and this corporation understand clearly from the beginning that the governmental function, *i.e.*, the attainment of the general public good, and the attainment of the particular public good in each industry must be secured even at the cost of occasional financial losses to the associate members of each Industrial Code Corporation.

These Industrial Code Corporations would really be designed and set up for the purpose of giving the nation's commercial life a graduated organic form in much the same way that municipal corporations give form to the local political life of cities. The very laws of nature induce those who dwell in close proximity to unite into corporate municipalities, and hence we have the incorporated cities of New York, Chicago, St. Louis, et cetera. And in much the same way, it is the natural and spontaneous development of at least an industrial society, if not an essential development in every civil society, that the diverse elements of any industry, *i.e.*, the forces of capital and the forces of labour engaged in any industrial unit, should have a corporate association based upon common bonds, such as the producing of a certain class of goods or giving service to the nation through a given industry. Capital and labour represent diverse functions in the industry, but the very industry itself constitutes a bond of corporate industrial union of capital and labour for the common good in accordance with principles of social justice and social charity.

We can readily see what would happen to a municipality if the various members or forces of that municipality were not united under the corporate form. There would be open warfare between the citizens of the "gold coast" and those who occupy the river front along the railroad yards. City governments bring hostile forces together under a corporate form of union which emphasizes their common bonds. Each industry too has its hostile forces which must be united for the common good. Capital cannot be left to live an independent life surrounded with excessive advantages and enriched with excessive profits. Labour cannot be left to live a life of complete misery – a life which faces starvation or continues only with the barest minimum of necessities, robbed of all enjoyment of this world's goods and all its dignity as a human life. Where capital and labour in each industry are left without a corporate form based upon common bonds, capital becomes monopolistic and usurious and labour becomes socialistic and communistic in its tendencies. And in this situation it requires miracles to prevent economic strife.

But just as St. Louis, New York, Chicago, and all the other cities have made themselves peaceful chartered units in our governmental framework so each industry must incorporate all its diverse forces, from the highest to the lowest, both the forces of capital and the forces of labour, into one organic wholesome corporate unit which would really be, if we may coin the word, an *industrocipality* or an *industropolis.*

Wherever a large body of people have been brought together in one locality the state has provided the necessary legislation for their incorporation and union into a municipality for definite governmental functions, subordinate to and dependent however upon the higher sovereign functions of the state, and likewise the state may in a given set of economic circumstances – circumstances of economic warfare detrimental to the public good – in the exercise of its legislative power demand the establishment of industrial corporate associations with governmental functions.* The state here takes the remedy which the exigencies of the natural circumstances themselves seem to indicate, in order that union may be brought to the different groups in each industry, groups who are at enmity and strife. It is a proper remedy and it is needed to break the supremacy of the powerful in the industry over the weak, a remedy needed to direct the activities of all the forces in the industry in such a way that the public well-being and private prosperity and finally the general national good may be achieved, a remedy needed ultimately to give organic social life to any industry that has really come to constitute a component part of the entire social structure.

---

* Bernard W. Dempsey, S.J.: *Quadragesimo Anno in the Business World* (Harvard Business Review, October, 1932). In this important contribution the author proves the need of *Functional Associations* and discusses the internal structure of certain types.

Each industry in the course of its natural economic development comes to the point where it requires an organic social form, in much the same way that New York, Chicago, St. Louis, and all other cities in the course of their historical development came to the point where they required an incorporated organic unit of their own in municipal government. The Industrial Code Corporation, therefore, is to an industry what a municipal government is to a city. The Industrial Code Corporation would be the "local" self-government in each industry, giving the opportunity of decentralization in this governmental problem, in such a way that complete centralization in Washington might be avoided. Such an Industrial Code Corporation would be subordinate to and dependent upon the state and Federal governments in much the same way that municipal governments are subordinate to and dependent upon higher forms of government in the counties, states, and nation. The Code Corporation would be the functional corporate power in each one of the various industrial cities, the city of steel, the city of textiles, the city of aluminum, the city of the automotive industry, et cetera, if we may thus use the word "city" to denote, not a locality, but the common industrial bond of capital and labour in each industry – a bond just as real and genuine as the bond of locality which gives the foundation for the incorporation of neighbours into municipalities.

This type of control through an Industrial Code Corporation in each industry may be adequate and work very well on the supposition that all joint stock corporations and labour unions will become members of the new functional corporation and remain loyal members, placing public good before private good, economic order before economic license. But how can the joint stock corporation be forced to accept and retain a membership in the Industrial Code Corporation? The New Dealers were satisfied here, in their sincere effort to achieve the public good, to rely upon the good will and patriotism and voluntary co-operation of the directorates of joint stock corporations and the boards of existing labour unions. It is difficult to see how in all fairness a government organization, an administration, that relies upon good will, patriotism, co-operation, partnership agreements, et cetera, can for any just and cogent reason be styled dictatorial, fascist, communistic, or unconstitutional in its approach to executive, legislative, and judicial problems. If anything it restricts the Constitution too much. It does not take enough power from the Constitution for the accomplishment of the task before it. We cannot securely rely on the power of a "blue eagle" in this difficult problem; we need to clothe the government with adequate constitutional authority.

In view of the principles enunciated in this paper we, of course, maintain that the government has the power to establish Industrial Code Corporations in each industry, and that it also has the power to pass a valid legislative decree, the constitutionality of which is beyond question, that all joint stock corporations, all capitalistic agencies, and all labour unions, the private capitalist and the private workman, must become and remain members of the Industrial Code Corporation when it is established in any given industry in which they are engaged. All units of the industry from the highest investor to the lowliest workman will be bound by force of law to follow the policies of this functional Industrial Code Corporation in its pursuit of the public good in the industry and in its subordination to the government in pursuit of the general national economic good. And until the N.R.A. really cuts such constitutional teeth, it will remain a mere legal baby.

But just as all indirect methods in any field, the indirect procedure of the New Dealers in the field of government is surrounded with some obscurity. The fact of the necessity of control of any kind for the public good and the very acts of control themselves will always admit of greater or less misinterpretation, and the legal authority to enforce a certain act of control will ultimately depend upon court decisions in which it will often happen that the judge may not have the principles which he must follow clearly before him in the form of written law. And until some very fundamental points of law are clarified the courts will be likely to have the tendency to favour a private joint stock corporation in preference to the position of the government and this perhaps for no other reason than that of the existing weight of judicial precedent, a precedent which has so highly emphasized the property rights of the joint stock corporations that as a consequence much harm, unintentional on the part of judges perhaps, but nevertheless real injustice, harm, and injury, was done to the enjoyment and possession of property rights by natural persons. This outworn precedent, of course, grew up in the impossible, irrational, un-Christian days of rugged individualism and economics without order.

V

In the last analysis the three methods which we have indicated, all of which rest on the constitutional principle of control and public responsibility, really reduce themselves to two. There is one (the second one) which calls for an outright amendment of the Federal Constitution — an amendment in no wise intended to introduce something novel into the Constitution, but an amendment that will clarify the terms of the Constitution in such a way that it will really confer upon human beings the liberty and the happiness and security which its framers so earnestly desired and which we Americans still treasure.

The first method, the correct interpretation method, and the third method, substantially the New Deal method, do not differ fundamentally. The correct interpretation method would have to establish the fact that the words of the Constitution already clearly confer economic liberty in the same sense that they confer liberty of suffrage, liberty of speech, liberty of the press, liberty of worship, and all the other human liberties it contains, and especially when these liberties depend in no small way upon economic liberty for all natural citizens. Furthermore the evident implication must be taken from the words of the Constitution that liberties mentioned there are not intended for artificial persons of the joint stock corporation type and the conclusion must be reached that the Constitution is a charter of liberties only for natural persons and for such corporate bodies as can vindicate their existence for the direct or indirect protection of natural rights. This correct interpretation method would be an honest effort to establish the fact that the Constitution already implicitly contains the terms which are indicated in the amendment of the second method. And before the indirect control of the New Dealers through Industrial Code Corporations, or third method, can be used with any high degree of effectiveness, the interpretation of the Constitution called for in the first method will really have to be established as the true meaning that every citizen accepts. The third method will therefore also have to struggle with the problem of establishing the true interpretation of the Constitution. Otherwise the old false claim of constitutional liberty for the joint stock corporation, even though it continues to reduce our citizens to servitude, will stand in the way and prevent the control that should be exercised and the good that should be accomplished.

We indicated above that there are other methods, but in our conception none of them are constitutional methods. Any other method would be thoroughly un-American, and we are too genuinely American, too genuinely admirers of the Constitution as a charter of liberties for human beings, to enter into the discussion of any other way than the American constitutional way.

REVIEWS

The Tragic Freedom of Man*

A PHILOSOPHICAL novelist, like George Eliot and Thomas Mann, Dostoievski invites to exploration of his ideas as well as of his characters. Berdyaev's book, in its French translation, bears the title *L'Esprit de Dostoievski*; and it eschews biography and literary criticism to concentrate on the intellectual and spiritual problems with which, so passionately, the great Russian struggled. Dostoievski was one of those persons, completely dynamized, for whom both persons and ideas are real. It is impossible to forget the impression of power which that total awareness makes upon his reader. For one creator at least, we say, thoughts live, as palpable as things; there exists, then, a drama in which thoughts play the rôles of hero and villain and soubrette, not that of commenting chorus. Dostoievski, even more than that other peaceless, writhing spirit, Donne, felt his thoughts. And thoughts triumphantly escape the pallidity of the textbook for his chief characters also. They argue, with one another and with themselves, as do men who have never heard the "problems of philosophy" reduced to neatly expository lectures at the university, but who really take them to represent spurs and flags, incitements to action.

Yet Dostoievski never, like Proust, dissolves his characters under his analysis; and for him persons, even more than ideas, are ultimate irrefragables. Dostoievski, idea-tormented as he was, found in persons—in John, Jane, and, *magno intervallo*, God—the ultimately real. Personality implied responsibility, and that in turn implied freedom.

---

* DOSTOIEVSKI: AN INTERPRETATION *by Nicholas Berdyaev* (SHEED & WARD. 227 pp. $2.00).

Dostoievski's central passion was freedom – not political or economic, but moral and spiritual. For him, man is constituted human by virtue of his tremendous and perilous liberty not only to know but to feel and to perform good and evil. Destroy or deny man's moral responsibility, and you evacuate his essence; you turn him into the passive product of heredity and environment, you reduce him to a tool or a toy. An Anglican archbishop once said: "I would rather see England drunk than England compulsorily sober." There spoke the Christian spirit as Dostoievski conceived it. God takes no pleasure in multitudes indoctrinated at the point of the sword, heretics converted by the imminence of flames, drunkards kept innocuous by prohibition, girls preserved in chastity by denial of a latch-key, or any variety of reform or legislated righteousness, even though proffered in the name of humanitarianism.

Even the Truth must not be coercive. When Christ was reviled by his tormentors, he opened not his mouth. He refused to perform a most exemplary humanitarian miracle, that of turning stones into bread. He never argued men into the Kingdom. And Christianity, for Dostoievski, must point to a Truth nailed to the cross. If the dogmas of religion were palpably and beyond gainsaying true, self-evidently triumphant, where then the test of faith? Theology is not a higher form of mathematics. Dostoievski does not offer "reasons" for belief in the will. Probably he would have agreed with Dr. Johnson that all *reason* is against it, that the *arguments* for determinism are logically the more cogent. In his profound "Legend", the Grand Inquisitor speaks: Christ is silent.

Dostoievski saw in both Catholicism and Socialism the manifestations of Antichrist, the denial of genuine freedom. In the name of the masses, incapable of thinking and likely to misuse their liberties, both set up dogmas and regulate *mores*. Priest and commissar take upon them the too heavy responsibilities of the ordinary, the unheroic men. But to relieve persons of their responsibilities is to depersonalize them. The Grand Inquisitor, a paternalistic Soviet, saw most men as too weak for Christ's epic freedom:

> We shall give them an unexciting modest happiness, suitable for the feeble creatures that they are. . . . Certainly we shall make them work, but in their spare time we shall organize their life like a children's game, with children's songs and cantatas and innocent dances. We shall allow them even sin, knowing that they are so weak and helpless.

Freedom is oppressive, tragic. Men fancy they want it, as the respectable white-collared Philistine fancies that he wants a week to go on the loose. Freed, they seek the nearest white-haired, rosy-faced jailer, the nearest doctrinaire, the nearest social organizer. They join themselves up to the thinker who says, very sensibly: "Any intelligent man could make a better world than this. God is the ultimate irrationality. Let's abolish Him and organize a society from which disease, poverty, sin, the slums, and the tears of children will be absent, where all will be as clean, neat, and well organized as Switzerland, with plenty of paint to whiten out old superstitions." *Dernier confort*, all modern improvements; all the bogies swept from the night; all the closet skeletons efficiently and sanitarily interred. I draw satirically; and truth to say I have no love of Geneva or of model villages. But certainly no man can surrender his comfort, that shadow but perhaps antitype of happiness, without a sigh; and few men are so hard of heart as to see others suffer without at least wishing "something could be done about it". And those who seem the noblest and most idealistic today are those who desire the loaves and fishes, not for themselves but for the masses. Dostoievski puts before us a painful alternative.

There are two freedoms, "the first to choose between good and evil, the last in the heart of good". On the second, the service to God which is perfect freedom, theologians have dilated. But for Dostoievski the tragic truth is that every man must first pass through the initial freedom, and that most men never reach the second state. Many are called, few chosen. For one Alyosha, there are many Ivans and Dmitris and Kirilovs and Raskolnikovs. Berdyaev is careful to warn the reader that this is incautious teaching. Identifying "reason" with the hated determinism, Dostoievski, like his admirer, Gide, in *Les Caves du Vatican*, tends to identify acts of free will with the irrational and capricious. And in his contempt for bourgeois respectability he, like the elder Henry James, that eloquent excoriator of "moralism", is in peril of turning antinomian. A pious Irish friend once declared to me, "The greatest saints were once the greatest sinners." A perilous maxim. Does it mean that the way to sanctity necessarily lies through sin? Dostoievski really means that criminality and saintliness both exemplify heroic wills. "The holy Magdalen", according to St. Augustine, "changed her object only, not her passion." But Dostoievski, who must be read only by the mature, exercises no care to be safe.

The Russians, declares Berdyaev, are either sinners or saints; they are incapable of being humanists. His own attitude seems to waver; sometimes he deplores the Slavic immunity to "culture" and the mean; at other times he seems to defend it. But he makes it clear that Dostoievski had no faith in morality or culture as salvations. Irving Babbitt liked to say that before we tried to be angels we had better try to be men. Dostoievski would have retorted: The human is by definition and essence that which strives toward the superhuman. Without God, men are but machines or insects; society, an ant-heap. "If you remove from the word 'human' all that belief in the supernatural has given man, you can view him finally as no more than an extremely clever, adaptable, and mischievous little animal." Thus T. S. Eliot. The Russian would have agreed.

Berdyaev sees in Dostoievski "Russia's greatest metaphysician" and knows, he says, "no more profoundly Christian writer". Yet in the concluding chapter in which he undertakes to "apply" the intuitions of this great Christian, Berdyaev proves wavering, inconclusive, and generally unsatisfactory. Though our expositor does not admit it, Dostoievski is, at least by implication, an anti-institutionalist in whose "system" the Church and its dogmas and sacraments have no place, a spiritual *laissez-faire-ist*. He is also a fideist; and though he never became bogged in German value-philosophies, though God never became for him an Absolute rather than a Person, he nevertheless was deficient in the historical sense and tended to regard faith and reason as antithetic rather than supplementary.

Dostoievski's thought, and Berdyaev's book, are, therefore, not for the catechumens, and offer little of what the old Calvinistic sermons included under the head of Application. They are concerned with first principles and Last Things. Berdyaev is neither a systematic thinker of the Teutonic sort nor a neat and orderly expositor of the French. Like his hero, he feels his thoughts; and he possesses a sincerity and an unprofessional eloquence which make his book genuinely moving. Here are no ready and facile answers to our questions; but the deepest inquiries of the human soul are given articulation and met with candour and virile faith.

AUSTIN WARREN

Ethics: East and West *

PRESENTED by the author as an effort to compare the ethical systems which have been evolved out of six of the world's great religions, this book is more accurately described as a selective criticism of six traditional moral philosophies from the viewpoint of an author who has absorbed a certain number of very modern ideas. Dr. Saunders offers his brief account of

* THE IDEALS OF EAST AND WEST *by Kenneth Saunders* (MACMILLAN. 246 pp. $2.50).

the world's great systems of morals – Indian, Chinese, Japanese, Greek, Hebrew, and Christian – and illustrates each such exposition with an appropriate anthology of prose and verse, culled not only from the *dicta* of the classical teachers of religion but also from the folklore and songs of the masses.

The book's aim, according to the preface, is to be useful in this age of transition when ethical ideals, like everything else which has come down to us, are being tried and tested. Finding a common element in all of his six chosen philosophies, the author tells us that "there are things in the traditional ethical systems which cannot be shaken, for they are rooted in the nature of man and come like that from the hand of God". He remarks that, not only in the parallels and similarities but also in the contrasts which emerge from a comparative study, there is useful matter for thought and conduct.

Starting from the axiom that the most important element in the history of civilization is the spiritual and moral core, he professes to unravel this central strand in the life and culture of each of the six peoples he has chosen for the elaboration of his thesis. Actually he does not succeed in his aim, for his series of chapters becomes, perhaps unconsciously, a plea for the special type of deliquescent Christianity, the particular brand of modern humanitarianism, which he seems to affect.

In his preface he indicates the general outlines of his approach. His method is to take certain figures which shall be representative of the various religious philosophies, like Buddha for India, Confucius for China, and so on. He warns us that such characteristic figures are not exclusive of one another, for the process of mutual give-and-take began long ago "and the great peoples themselves are far too complex for any one ideal type to satisfy them". Despite this supposed complexity he finds that the ideal type is still the sage teacher in China, the other-worldly saint in India, and the practical reformer in Japan. Then he proceeds to indicate the ideals of the West, and we have this paragraph:

> The walls between religion and science are wearing thin, and *there are many who are finding religious and moral inspiration in the man of science* detached and seeking no rewards other than those of his quest for truth. This is the Greek ideal. Yet the Jewish type of Saint, suffering for a great cause and identifying himself with the common people, has still an immense appeal, and it is perhaps in these two types that the Western world is making its greatest contribution to Asia. [The italics are mine.]

It is not quite obvious what is meant by the statement that the walls between religion and science are wearing thin, since any proper concept of these two terms shows that there is no conflict between them. The phrase, however, is reminiscent of one of yesterday's forgotten faiths. Till the Great War shook our generation out of its complacency, faith in science was the faith of the modern world. Apparently that faith is not quite dead, and the worship of science as a factor of modern commercial expansion is implicit in this book.

Be that as it may, there is certainly confusion in the phrase I have italicized. What religious inspiration is to be found in the contemplation of the detachment of the man of science? The function of the scientist is to observe and classify natural phenomena. He is concerned with physics, not with metaphysics. He does not presume, in his rôle as a student of nature, to tell mankind about ultimate causes, about the hereafter, about the eternal verities. The being or purpose of God, the universe as fashioned and sustained by Him, and man as conditioned by and dependent on the Deity, these things are not the concern of the man of science as such. Similarly, the problems of the origin and validity of conscience, of the meaning of voluntary action, of the adequacy of motives and the significance of desires, and all such questions of human conduct are utterly outside his province. Yet the author finds this studious individual, immersed in his researches, to be a source of religious and moral inspiration to many today and to be one of the two ideal types through which "the Western world is making its greatest contribution to Asia".

Still keeping within the confines of the preface, which is a general introduction to the special treatments of the six religious philosophies, we have the author telling us his hopes of the outcome of this "greatest contribution to Asia". He thinks that East and West should be brought into harmony with each other and he looks forward to the time when, by a better understanding of one another's ideals, they may be no longer divided. There are great and creative teachers of ethics whom we all must know, he says. "They belong to us all, and East and West must cease from provincialism in a world now made one." This is all very fine, till we begin to see what he means by the expression "a world now made one".

Of the three chapters on the East, that on Japan offers the best index to the meaning to be attached to this phrase. He hails that country as a convert to Christianity and takes care to present a list of the benefits it has thereby received. "The leaven of the kingdom of God is at work in Japan." What he refers to is, of course, the poisonous virus of our capitalist industrialism. How far he is from realizing this is indicated by a quotation he gives us from Lord Elgin:

> A perfectly paternal government: a perfectly filial people: a community entirely self-supporting: peace within and without: no want: no ill-will between classes. This is what I find in Japan in the year 1858 after two hundred years' exclusion of foreign trade and intercourse.

Then came the foreign trader, the missionary of progress, the apostle of the industrial civilization. Rather, in the viewpoint of the author, then came Christianity. What some of the results of that successful evangelization of Japan have been is to be found recorded in the headlines of our daily newspapers with their tales of the strikes, of the economic enslavement of the Japanese people, of the political unrest, of the poison of imperialist greed and ambition, of the distrust that is necessarily being engendered against commercial rivals. In other words, every one of the blessings which Lord Elgin found to admire in Japanese life seventy-five years ago has been evangelized out of existence and has been replaced by one or other of the evils that are the mark of our Western system.

It is inconceivable that Dr. Saunders does not know of the existence of those evils in Japan today. If he does not mention them in his book, we are compelled to assume that he fails to realize their significance and that he is blind to the fact that they are the necessary concomitants of a civilization organized on the principles of capitalist industrialism. His main interest is in the humanitarian work that is being done by the Christian teachers, but he fails to see that the real scope of the Christian message is something nobler and higher than merely tidying up the capitalist mess and clearing away the human debris that the machines of modern industry leave behind.

Incidentally it may be mentioned here that he calls attention to an alleged decrease in the divorce rate, citing Dr. Kagawa, "novelist and social reformer", as his authority. The Kagawa quotation is not without its humorous aspect:

> Forty years ago, out of every thousand marriages there were four hundred and thirty divorces. Now there are only a hundred and seven, as compared to about two hundred in New York. Why? By reason of Christianity.

The inference is obvious: Dr. Kagawa and other Japanese Christians ought to heed the call to New York. Evidently a band of Japanese missionaries would find the fields white for the harvest along the banks of the Hudson.

In conclusion it must be stated that Dr. Saunders's noble purpose in putting his hand to the task of this comparative study of the world's great ethical systems is not to be questioned, nor is his sincerity in doubt for a moment. For, whatever be the individual result of any such effort, it remains true that one of the best means of reaching an understanding of the traditional Christian ethic is by way of comparison with other systems of ethical thought. But what is to be questioned is the manner of his approach. Had he remembered that such a study as he proposed must be made in an attitude of humility rather than in a mood of assurance, he would doubtless have succeeded in interpreting more clearly for his readers the deep and abiding meaning of that admirable phrase with which he begins his preface, namely that there are certain principles common to all the great ethical systems, principles which "are rooted in the nature of man and come like that from the hand of God".

CHAS. F. RONAYNE

Mediaeval Tales *

THESE small tales of "mutual charities between saints and beasts" are drawn from the Latin of the fourth to the end of the twelfth century. They are translations, exercises in which Miss Waddell is surpassing. For the sake of those who enjoy Æsop, that elderly Greek who was the father of shrewdness, be it known that there is only one churlish beast in the book. But even this Unsociable Lion is finely aloof in his churlishness.

The early saints lived easily with their beasts, but as the centuries marched towards the Age of Reason this gentle understanding passed. Saint Francis, who called all beasts his brethren, is an exception. In the thirteenth century, man finally dominated the scene, nor was he afterwards inclined to share it. The taste in miracles tended towards the baroque, eventually towards the pointless. Though not entirely, practically the long alliance between saint and beast was at an end. I think the saint was more obviously the loser, for

---

* BEASTS AND SAINTS *by Helen Waddell* (HOLT. 151 pp. $2.50).

the beast was naturally the servant of the servant of God.

The Desert Fathers cleared the Nile on crocodiles; the lion was their beast of burden when the humble ass vanished into the howling wilderness. Saint Simeon Stylites, from his inhospitable pillar, converted a dragon. But this is big game, almost as remote as the hobgoblins that tried the patience of Saint Anthony. I like the Saints of the West better than the holy gentlemen who prayed along the Nile, and I like the Saints of Ireland best of all.

Saint Columba, whose name seems absurdly meek for the strong-tempered founder of Iona, appears in a moderately dove-like rôle. The second of his legends is recommended to those who need fortification against eternity; composition, *in articulo*, is an art. The Voltaires of the world do not die well. From this solemn fragment of a great life to the tale of Saint Werburga of Chester and the Wild Geese is a short span in time, but the tone is everyday cheerful, almost bantering. And so on. I cannot forbear quoting, in its entirety, the legend of Saint Benno and the Frog:

> It was often the habit of the man of God to go about the fields in meditation and prayer; and once as he passed by a certain marsh, a talkative frog was croaking in its slimy waters: and lest it should disturb his contemplation, he bade it to be a Seraphian, inasmuch as all the frogs of Seraphus are mute. But when he had gone on a little way, he called to mind the saying in Daniel: "*O ye whales and all that move in the waters, bless ye the Lord. O all ye beasts and cattle, bless ye the Lord.*" And fearing lest the singing of the frogs might perchance be more agreeable

to God than his own praying, he again issued his command to them, that they should praise God in their accustomed fashion: and soon the air and fields were vehement with their conversation.

Pleasant, indeed, were those days, when even frogs knew their Pliny!

Such delights are treasured in the frowning volumes of Migne and the *Acta Sanctorum* and a few more collections. Miss Waddell says that she has translated the legends "without sophistication", which is their due. These should send even the indifferent Latinist to the originals, which are "without sophistication" to an extent appreciated, if not achieved, by Miss Waddell. Yet I cannot applaud too highly the delicacy of this lady's translations or the breadth and discrimination of her selections. Nor do I care to take the translator to task because of some obvious omissions. I can do without Saint Patrick for a spell, and even more so without those mysterious birds, holy themselves and immaterial, that hovered about the lips of Saint Gregory the Great. This book, in small as delicious as the *moralia* of Jean de la Fontaine himself, rightly avoids metaphysics.

WALLACE BROCKWAY

Ruskin*

THE portrait that faces the title page of Mr. Wilenski's work shows us a countenance which, in any company, would be taken for that of an extraordinary man. The brow, large, rounded, delicately moulded, is that of a poet or a musician. It is surrounded by a great mop of hair, bespeaking animal health, even animal vigour. The keen, clear, piercing eyes, set deep in the head under bushy eyebrows, contain something of humour as well as power of sympathy and of critical discrimination. The nose is long, drooping, finely modelled—the nose of an aristocrat. It has none of the peasant coarseness, the truculent earthliness of the noses of Carlyle, Tolstoi, or D. H. Lawrence. But the entire lower half of this face belies the striking impression of the upper. A long, drooping jaw is surmounted with a petulant, weak, yet obstinate mouth and chin. Such a face, we feel, might achieve large success or large failure, but could scarcely strike a middle ground. It is the face of the great Victorian art critic and social reformer, John Ruskin.

---

* **JOHN RUSKIN: An Introduction to Further Study of His Life and Work** *by R. H. Wilenski* (STOKES. 406 pp. $4.50).

Ruskin's reputation among critics has already suffered from alternate periods of exaggerated admiration and complete scepticism and distrust—periods that, Mr. Wilenski has pointed out, are accurately reflected in the course of his own life. Born in 1819, of severely pietistic parents who alternately adored and bullied him, he achieved early notoriety by his wealth as patron of art, as champion of Turner and the Pre-Raphaelites, and as writer of an elaborate purple prose; a prose less elaborate than that of his disciple Pater, but far more deeply imbued with a sense of wild natural beauty and with cadences caught from the Bible, than anything Pater could command. But it is obvious that his position as a wealthy art dilettante irked him. From the outset he had pictured himself as the prophet raised up by God to reveal to men the beauties of Turner's works, the glories of Venetian art, the real aims of the Pre-Raphaelites. He yearned, more than for anything else, for a position of power and influence in which he could show to the Philistines of his day the connection which he felt existed between great art and national well-being; a connection that he thought had been lost since the end of the Renaissance in Italy, and in England ever since the dawn of the industrial nineteenth century.

The opportunity that he was seeking finally came, in his appointment as Professor of Fine Arts at Oxford, in 1870, but it was already too late. He was then fifty-nine, with the history of a loveless, unhappy, and fruitless marriage behind him, an even longer history of deference to his parents' wishes which had only been recently broken by the death of his father in 1864, and a growing morbid obsession with a schoolgirl eleven years old which had been operating in him ever since his fortieth birthday. He was therefore in no position to assume the leadership which he thought to be legitimately his in the fields of art and of political and social economy, when the opportunity to take that position finally came. The remainder of his life was to mark the increase of his fame as a writer of exquisite prose and proclaimer of eccentric social and economic paradoxes, but the final work, which would have made his reputation for all time, never came and a growing mental darkness, leading to utter collapse, took its place.

It is with this tragic story that Mr. Wilenski has to deal; and unfortunately his approach to it is vitiated at the outset by the supposition that his protagonist was already suffering from morbid accesses of over-confidence followed by rapid falls into depression (a condition known to the medical profession as symptomatic of manic-depressive insanity) when he published his first volume of *Modern Painters* at the age of twenty-four. That Ruskin did believe himself at this age to be the prophet appointed by God to display Turner's superiority over the Ancients, is certain; and it is equally certain that he did not then know enough about the Ancients to be able to contrast them effectively with Turner. But if we are to assume that this over-confidence in his case amounted to insanity, as Mr. Wilenski does assume, then we have to assume the same thing in the case of Blake, of Wordsworth, of Coleridge, of Goethe, of multitudinous other writers and artists who have believed it to be their mission to reform art; not to mention the Hebrew Prophets, who strove to do the same thing for religion. Even if one is fundamentally only an art critic, as Ruskin was, one has to make a beginning somewhere, and Ruskin nowhere showed the Englishness of his mind to better advantage than by beginning with Turner. That, under the influence of the dour Protestant piety of his parents, he did not see the connection between frank pagan earthliness and Catholic piety in the work of the great men of the Renaissance, and that, when he did see it, it frankly shocked him, may be admitted; he was, though unwittingly, a Puritan by inheritance; but, as time went on, a more and more rebellious one. Yet surely his embarking on a task beyond his powers at the age of twenty-three was no symptom of anything else than the healthy desire, common to all genius, to achieve, in youth, a task beyond its equipment.

Mr. Wilenski is on surer ground when he puts the mental crisis that left Ruskin a broken man around the age of forty. Up to that time he had been prominent chiefly as a wealthy dilettante of art. Suddenly he throws over his reputation and embarks on a series of articles on political and social economy in the *Cornhill* and *Fraser's Magazine* for 1860-62, which were reprinted as *Munera Pulveris* and *Unto This Last*. Mr. Wilenski is quite right in saying that these articles caused no wide ripple of scandal, as Ruskin's official apologists have declared. The newspapers of the day, being, as they were, imbued with the triumph of competitive "free-trade" that found England prepared to support the North in the American Civil War—and child-labour at eighteen hours a day in her factories at home—reviewed both series of articles unfavourably. Subscribers to both magazines protested, and Ruskin was then forced to discontinue both series.

In his growing condition of morbidity, at war with his age and his parents, and sexually starved to boot, it undoubtedly appeared to him that all England was against him. But when *Unto This Last* reappeared in book form, it took, says Mr. Wilenski, eleven years to sell 880 copies!

It was this condition of being a prophet without honour in his own country, added to the growing exasperation of a life under parental domination, that broke John Ruskin mentally. That he only broke gradually, not with dramatic suddenness, speaks volumes for his integrity, both physically and mentally. That the parents were primarily responsible Mr. Wilenski leaves us in no doubt. As he says:

The frustration from this quarter was not all imaginary. There is ample evidence from records left by people who visited Denmark Hill that his mother still bullied him as though he were a schoolboy; that she habitually contradicted him on matters of which she knew nothing; that she insisted on expressing her views to everyone who came to the house; and that she repeatedly told him that his ridiculous ideas were the result of listening to people like Carlyle, Froude, and Bishop Colenso. It is also clear that his father disapproved of his writings outside the field of art and not only expressed his disapproval, but actively impeded his work in the social, economic, and political fields. In the fifties he had suppressed some letters on political problems which Ruskin had destined for *The Times*, and now he vetoed another letter, on Gold, and exacted a definite promise that Ruskin would not publish anything in the press without previously submitting the text to him.

This, be it added, when the unfortunate man was past forty!

This parental interference, added to the hostility of the press, superadded to his own starved and retarded sexual appetite, slowly unhinged Ruskin—and the parental interference was the worst of all, inasmuch as it is clear to Mr. Wilenski (and I think to everyone who has looked into Ruskin's case with sympathy) that by abandoning art criticism proper for the new field of social and political economy, he was becoming more and more of a force in that reformation and reclassification of society which the twentieth century is now attempting, half-heartedly and probably too late. What Ruskin essentially foresaw, that no great art (as the past knew it) was possible so long as the industrial process was allowed to run hand in hand with unchecked competition, is now our dilemma; the attempt he made to bring society back to a frame of mind that would no longer be individualistic, but co-operatively religious, and thereby to negative the evils of nineteenth-century industrialism, must be resumed under far less favourable conditions today. For today there is no moral tradition to offset mechanistic competition; and we have seen one of the countries that put up the longest resistance to this modern process, that is to say, Russia, becoming foremost in raising mechanistic and materialistic industrialism to the status of a godless religion. What Ruskin foresaw was that the modern industrial process, coming into the world alongside of unchecked individual competition, would end by wrecking all the local and particular loyalties and patriotisms of mankind as well as the leading religious creeds (Protestant as well as Catholic); and so he set himself to fight it, in the name of a deeper concept of public spirit and service. Unfortunately, the man who undertook this fight was a man whose mind was becoming more and more unhinged, as Mr. Wilenski points out, with neuroses and phobias that had little to do with the main issue. The main issue was, and remains, the question whether the modern state can survive alongside of unchecked and uncontrolled industrialism.

It was, then, in attempting this work when he was past forty that John Ruskin became for the first time great; and the measure of his greatness is to be seen in the fact that a person like Mr. Wilenski, brought up in a different milieu, with totally opposed ideas about art and its relation to alleged "science", can still take his political and economic ideas seriously.

But in this respect Mr. Wilenski has but followed others, notably Professor Soddy. However, the inability of Mr. Wilenski to decide how many of Ruskin's ideas are still valid under the changed conditions of today may be judged by the fact that he believes naïvely that the essentials of Ruskin's own gospel have been restated for our time by Mr. H. G. Wells! Surely this speaks volumes, not for the limitations of Ruskin, but for Mr. Wilenski's own limitations. For it is clear that where, to Wells, religion—either personal or corporate—means nothing at all, to Ruskin it meant everything, though it may be true that to him, having overthrown the Puritan piety of his youth, and being unable to see good in Catholicism since the Renaissance, orthodoxy in religious matters had become impossible—as it is today for millions of others in similar case. But surely his ideal state, with its careful preservation and indeed heightening of local patriotisms and pre-industrial religions (the Guild of St. George, which Mr. Wilenski pokes fun at, had no other purpose) along with craftsmanship, good workmanship, and control of industry through governmental action—surely this ideal state is utterly removed from the "world state" run by scientists, aviators, free-lovers, industrial experts, and sentimental pacifists of an H. G. Wells type. One has only to read a page from each writer to see the fundamental—and unmistakable—difference.

However, Mr. Wilenski would presumably be the first to disclaim finality for this estimate of the greatest aesthetic and moral thinker that England produced in the entire nineteenth century. His title calls this work an "Introduction" only; and the more one studies Ruskin, the more one finds it difficult to place him in his proper perspective. It does seem extraordinary that a man of such intense sensibility, alive as few have been to the beauties of English landscape painting, and to early Italian art, should have been blind to the great development of French painting that, leading off from Delacroix and Ingres, was going on under his nose when he wrote, and should have made himself the champion instead of the false will-o'-the-wisp of the pre-Raphaelites. But here again, the English of the man was apparent. French art may have struck him as being too deliberately and coldly logical, too lacking in lyrical and mystical impulse, to contain the spiritual elements which he found in Greek myth, in Gothic architecture, in Italian painting, in the landscape of Turner, and which he overlooked in baroque art because of its air of worldliness. And it is precisely this quality, which Ruskin shares with the great poets of the English race (but not with H. G. Wells), that has kept his work alive today. It is to be hoped that Mr. Wilenski, who has already written wisely and well of Greek and modern sculpture, will not abandon his work at this juncture, but will some day give us further studies in the mind and achievements of John Ruskin.

JOHN GOULD FLETCHER